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ABSTRACT
Conventional climate change wisdom tells governments to plan for a
2°C increase in global average temperature. However, increasingly robust
science indicates that the planet is well on its way to at least 4°C of
warming, possibly by the end of the 21st century or shortly thereafter. That
much warming is a governance game changer, taking the multiple and
interconnected complex systems that define U.S. society across thresholds
and tipping points into cascades of transformational change. Critically,
these systems potentially include the United States’ system of government—
the key system that must successfully adapt to the coming changes in order
for the country as a whole to have any chance of adapting peacefully,
equitably, and productively to systemic transformation while still remaining
a democracy.
This Article seeks to push U.S. climate change adaptation policy toward
an entirely new mode of governance necessary to meet the challenges
ahead. It does so by making five novel arguments. First, it assembles recent
scientific climate change studies to show that a 4°C warmer future is
currently the planet’s most likely trajectory. Second, it argues that being on
that trajectory necessitates the dissociation of climate change mitigation
and adaptation goals so that adaptation policy is free to address this more
dire future. Third, it summarizes recent science to demonstrate that 4°C of
warming poses a categorically different adaptation challenge than 2°C, as
in situ adaptation becomes increasingly impossible, inducing both species
and large numbers of people to migrate within U.S. boundaries. Fourth, to
deal with these migrations and their attendant needs and consequences, this
Article describes both a new mode of climate change adaptation, called
“redesign” adaptation, and the governance tools available to coordinate,
promote, and guide the equitable and productive resettlement of the United
States. Finally, the Article argues that the United States, with strong
leadership and funding from the federal government, needs to initiate
anticipatory governance practices now to facilitate redesign adaptation in
the future, beginning with a new national foresight research program.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, while the world’s attention was focused on the coronavirus
pandemic, an international team of 89 polar scientists from 50 organizations reported that
Greenland and Antarctica are losing ice six times faster than they were in the 1990s.1
Based on satellite data, the research team concluded that “[i]f the current melting trend
continues, the regions will be on track to match the ‘worst-case’ scenario of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of an extra 6.7 inches (17
centimeters) of sea level rise by 2100.”2 One month later, in Siberia, “the small town of
Verkhoyansk (67.5°N latitude) reached 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit, 32 degrees above the
normal high temperature” and “likely the hottest temperature ever recorded in Siberia and
also the hottest temperature ever recorded north of the Arctic Circle, which begins at
66.5°N.”3 All around the town, the Arctic tundra was burning.4 This was not an anomaly,
but rather the leading edge of a trend. Throughout the northern hemisphere, wildfire
danger is expanding northward: before enflaming the Arctic in 2020, wildfire devastated
large parts of Norway, Sweden, and Scotland in the summer of 2019.5
The accelerating ice loss and expanding wildfire zones are potential markers of
what are known as tipping points—thresholds along a nonlinear pattern of system change
that, once crossed, move the system into a new set of positive feedback dynamics that
accelerate the pace of change and can be extremely difficult to reverse.6 Scientists are
increasingly concerned that we are dangerously close to passing these and many other
irreversible climate change tipping points, especially with respect to the West Antarctic
ice sheet, tropical coral reefs, the Amazon rain forest, and the Arctic boreal forest.7 To
add an additional chaotic possibility, once these and other systems tip, they might set off
cascades of transformations in other natural systems.8
1

Greenland, Antarctica Melting Six Times Faster Than in the 1990s, NASA GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (Mar. 16, 2020), https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2958/greenland-antarctica-melting-six-timesfaster-than-in-the-1990s/.
2
Id.
3
Jeff Berardelli, “Arctic records its hottest temperature ever,” CBS NEWS (updated June 23, 2020,
8:47 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/arctic-hottest-temperature-ever/.
4
Id.
5
Scotland, Norway and Sweden already severely affected by forest fires due to the dry weather in
the north, CTIF: INTL. ASS’N FIRE & RESCUE SERVS., (24 April 2019), https://www.ctif.org/news/scotlandnorway-and-sweden-already-severely-effected-forest-fires-due-dry-weather-north.
6
See Marten Scheffer, Early-warning Signs for Critical Transitions, 461 NATURE 53 (2009).
7
Timothy M. Lenton, Johan Rockström, Owen Gaffney, Stefan Rahmstorf, Katherine Richardson,
Will Steffen & Hans Joachim Schellnhuber , Climate Tipping Points—Too Risky to Bet Against, 575
NATURE 592, 592-95 (2019) (corrected April 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-01903595-0). For example, there is evidence that the Greenland ice sheet is experiencing mass loss at
accelerating rates and has “switch[ed] to a new dynamic state of sustained mass loss that would persist even
under a decline in surface melt.” Michalea D. King, Ian M. Howat, Salvatore G. Candela, Myoung J. Noh,
Seongsu Jeong, Brice P. Y. Noël, Michiel R. van den Broeke, Bert Wouters & Adelaide Negrete, Dynamic
Ice Loss from the Greenland Ice Sheet Driven by Sustained Glacier Retreat, 1 COMMUNICATIONS EARTH
& ENV’T 1, 1 (2020) (corrected Sept. 4, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-020-0001-2.
8
Lenton et al., supra note 7, at 593; Will Steffen, Johan Rockström, Katherine Richardson,
Timothy M. Lenton, Carl Folke, Diana Liverman, Colin P. Summerhayes, Anthony D. Barnosky, Sarah E.
Cornell, Michel Crucifix, Jonathan F. Donges, Ingo Fetzer, Steven J. Lade, Marten Scheffer, Ricarda
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And yet, if you consult climate scientists’ predictions from as recently as a decade
ago, none of these climate change impacts are supposed to be happening yet.
No one can fault the scientists of a decade ago for underestimating the pace and
intensity of climate change. They were and still are studying a rapidly moving target. For
example, the peak annual atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2), the major
driver of climate change, was 357 parts per million (ppm) in 1990, 367 ppm in 2000, 388
ppm in 2010, and 413 ppm in 2020. All of these levels are unprecedented in the past
800,000 years, and the highest, at over 400 ppm, has not been experienced by our planet
for three million years.9 In addition, knowledge and technologies also are improving as
research observes climate change, in many cases revealing that projections were
underestimating the pace of change.10 It is thus no wonder that as researchers keep
studying the ongoing changes in natural systems, they are finding that impacts are hitting
harder and faster than previously expected.11
This trend has significant and potentially dire implications for governance and
law. Climate change disruptions will extend not only to ecological systems, but to social
systems as well, including systems of governance. It would be naïve to believe that
governance in the United States will be immune; indeed, democratic systems of
governance may be particularly unstable in the face of the relentless disruptions caused
by climate change. Recognizing that this is a weighty claim in need of solid support, this
Article does not mince words. It is long, detailed, and extensively referenced. We lean
heavily on scientific findings reported in leading peer-reviewed journals,12 the amalgam
of which paints a picture of our nation’s (and the world’s) future that is nothing short of
a policy nightmare. Getting the policies wrong—that is, failing to anticipate and
adaptively plan for that future—presents an existential threat to democratic governance.
To be sure, policy disciplines have already grown far more sophisticated in their
understanding of climate change governance compared to, say, the dawn of the 21st
Winkelmann, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber. Trajectories of the Earth System in the Anthropocene, 115
PNAS 8252, 8253-54 (2018), www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1810141115.
9
Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, NOAA CLIMATE.GOV (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-atmospheric-carbondioxide; M. Willeit, A. Ganopolski, R. Calov & V. Brovkin, Mid-Pleistocene Transition in Glacial Cycles
Explained by Declining CO2 and Regolith Removal, 5(4) SCI. ADVANCES eaav7337 (2019), DOI:
10.1126/sciadv.aav7337.
10
Michael Oppenheimer & Richard B. Alley, How High Will the Seas Rise?, 354 SCI. 1375 (2016)
(noting that projections of sea level rise keep getting higher based on improved knowledge of dynamical
processes).
11
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE OCEAN AND
CRYOSPHERE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 6-7, 9 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 IPCC OCEAN & ICE REPORT] (“Each
of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade
since 1850.”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS
REPORT 6-7 (2014) [hereafter 2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT] (noting that the global land temperature is
rising twice as quickly as it should naturally).
12
Although neither of us is a climate scientist, one of us holds a doctorate degree in ecological
geography, the other is a trained science writer with a doctorate degree that explored the incorporation of
science into literary descriptions of social and ecological change. Both of us regularly publish work in
scientific journals, often as part of interdisciplinary teams including scientists from the natural and social
sciences. We feel adequately equipped to collect, evaluate, and synthesize the available climate science for
a policy audience.
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century, and the severity of climate change is broadly motivating policy discourse. There
is now widespread agreement that both mitigation—that is, efforts to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and the concentration of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere13—and adaptation—which encompasses efforts to adjust human behavior to
climate change’s unavoidable alterations14—must be concurrent governance efforts.15
Moreover, those efforts must be cognizant of each other, because mitigation and
adaptation strategies interact, sometimes working in tandem to produce co-benefits (e.g.,
water conservation generally reduces energy consumption), but sometimes involving
trade-off conflicts (e.g., subsidizing biofuels at the expense of food security).16 Finally,
because both climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation require
governance efforts at multiple scales, from local to international, coordination of these
efforts is likely to become an increasingly important part of the overall climate change
governance challenge.17
So far, so good. But here’s the rub: which future should governments and other
governance entities be coordinating about? Climate change adaptation inherently requires
present governance institutions and arrangements to anticipate future conditions that are
distant in time, in constant flux, riddled with uncertainty, and unlike any experienced in
recorded human history. The conventional “predict and plan” mode of governance is
stretched beyond its capacity under such conditions. Scholars in the planning and policy
sciences thus have called for a new form of governance, which they call anticipatory
governance, to reflect the challenge of formulating climate adaptation policy strategies
that are built around a range of dynamic possible future scenarios and require constant
monitoring and policy adjustment.18 The crucial first step in anticipatory governance for
climate change adaptation, therefore, is what range of scenarios to use.
13

2014 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 11, at 17.
Id. at 19.
15
Id. at 17.
16
Mia Landauer, Sirkku Juhola & Maria Söderholm, Inter=relationship between Adaptation and
Mitigation:
A Systemic Literature Review, 131 CLIMATIC CHANGE 505, 505-17 (2015),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-015-1395-1 (summarizing research on mitigation and adaptation interrelationships); Ayyoob Sharifi, Co-benefits and Synergies between Urban Climate Change Mitigation and
Adaptation Measures: A Literature Review, 750 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 141642, at 9-15 (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.141642 (focusing on the synergies); Ayyoob Sharifi, Trade-offs
and Conflicts between Urban Climate Change and Adaptation Measures: A Literature Review, 276 J.
CLEANER PROD. 122813, at 7-12 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122813(focusing on the
conflicts).
17
See, e.g., Elizabeth Burleson, A Climate of Extremes: Transboundary Conflict Resolution, 32
VERMONT L. REV. 477, 496, 501 (2008) (noting the agreement within both the United States National
Academy of Sciences and the international community that coordination of climate change adaptation and
mitigation is necessary).
18
See, e.g., Karlijn Muiderman, Aarti Gupta, Joost Vervoort &Frank Biermann, Four Approaches
to Anticipatory Climate Governance: Different Conceptions of the Future and Implications for the Present,
11 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE e673, at 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.673; Ray Quay, Anticipatory
Governance: A Tool for Climate Change Adaptation, 76 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 496, 498-99 (2010), DOI
10.1080/01944363.2010.508428. Anticipatory governance theory also has been influential in the
nanotechnology realm. See, e.g., David H. Guston, Understanding “Anticipatory Governance”, 44 SOCIAL
STUD. SCI. 218, 2019 (2014), DOI: 10.1177/0306312713508669. For more detail on anticipatory
governance theory, see infra Part IV.C-D.
14
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Until recently, the answer was straightforward, driven by a unified vison of the
future based on a hardline goal for climate mitigation policy. The standard policy goal
for the mitigation modality has been that we should be working relentlessly to contain the
global average increase in temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels ideally, and
to 2°C at worst (2.7°F to 3.6°F).19 This is the mitigation goal of multiple organizations
and international agreements. Under the 2015 Paris Accord, for example, nearly every
signatory country pledged to keep global temperatures “well below” 2°C above preindustrial levels and to “pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to
1.5C.”20
Adaptation policy has mostly followed mitigation policy’s lead, built primarily
around projections of measures needed to adjust to what the world will look like when it
is 1.5° to 2°C warmer than pre-industrial times.21 To be sure, adaptation will be necessary,
even for that future. For example, the IPCC has spelled out in great detail the adaptations
that would be required as a way of emphasizing the need to try to keep global warming
to below 2°C.22 Framed this way, adaptation policy has supported mitigation policy
through their unified view of the future.
However, the 2°C as maximum assumption no longer works in the adaptation
modality. As we detail in Part I, despite the continued international homage to this
mitigation goal, most contemporary evaluations of the progress of climate change
indicate that the increase in global average temperature will exceed 2°C, and probably

19
“Global average temperature” refers to the average surface temperature of the entire planet. The
IPCC, for example, traditionally defines global mean surface temperature (“GMST”) using a weighted
average of near-surface air temperatures over land (“SAT”) and sea surface temperatures over the ocean
(“SST”), INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C, at 56 (2018)
[hereinafter 2018 IPCC 1.5 °C REPORT]. Increases in this average temperature are a handy way to reference
how much the planet as a whole has warmed, but—like most means—this average does not necessarily
reflect the actual temperature conditions of any particular place or the warming that that place has
experienced. The IPCC “defines ‘warming’, unless otherwise qualified, as an increase in multi-decade
global mean surface temperature (GMST) above pre-industrial levels. Specifically, warming at a given
point in time is defined as the global average of combined land surface air and sea surface temperatures for
a 30-year period centered on that time, expressed relative to the reference period 1850–1900 … .” Id.
20
The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE (as viewed Jan. 9, 2021),
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-parisagreement#:~:text=Its%20goal%20is%20to%20limit,neutral%20world%20by%20mid%2Dcentury. For a
history of the 2°C goal, see generally Yun Gao, Xiang Gao, & Xiaohua Zhang, The 2℃ Global Temperature
Target and the Evolution of the Long-Term Goal of Addressing Climate Change—From the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change to the Paris Agreement, 3 ENGINEERING 272 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ENG.2017.01.022; Mark New, Diana Liverman, Heike Schroder, & Kevin
Anderson, Four degrees and beyond: The potential for global temperature to increase four degrees and its
implications, 369 PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC. A 6, 7-8 (2011), doi:10.1098/rsta.2010.0303.
21
We review adaptation policy design in Part III, infra. For the most comprehensive survey of
United States adaptation law and policy, see THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds. 2013) [hereinafter LAW OF
ADAPTATION].
22
2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
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exceed 3°C, this century,23 with increases continuing beyond 2100.24 Given the
trajectories of CO2 atmospheric concentrations and anthropogenic emissions (not to
mention additional emissions from the effects of climate change on ecosystems), the 2°C
limit is likely achievable only if both the sensitivity of climate to CO2 concentrations
going forward is low25 and either (1) technology developed in the next 50 years makes
net negative emissions possible and globally substantial, or (2) global emissions peak
rapidly and then fall for the next several decades at rates never before voluntarily achieved
by any single nation.26 As we explain in Part I, these are unrealistic assumptions, at best.
Given this likely trajectory, a dual-minded approach to climate change, politically
difficult as it is, is necessary to simultaneously give the planet the best future possible
(mitigation governance) while preparing humanity for the worst of the probable realities
(adaptation governance). In other words, mitigation policy and adaptation policy can no
longer operate under a unified view of the future. Rather, like Schrödinger’s cat,
governance entities must simultaneously resonate in two different climate futures—a
mitigation modality aimed at a ceiling of 2°C and an adaptation modality prepared for an
increase in global average temperature as high as 4°C.27
We both are committed to aggressive mitigation policy, and any failure to stay
below 2°C warming should spur redoubled efforts to stabilize the planetary climate
system at as small a temperature increase as possible. Nevertheless, we do not here engage
the emerging debate over whether mitigation policy should continue to frame itself
around the 1.5°-2°C goal.28 Rather, our focus is on the need to begin thinking about the
governance necessary to successfully adapt to a far warmer world—a 4°C future.
What the United States and other nations are doing to adapt to a 2°C future will
not be enough for this warmer world. As we explain in Part II, research increasingly
identifies warming of 2°C as a likely tipping point threshold for many ecological
systems.29 Evidence from the historical records and advanced modeling depict warming
beyond 2°C as game changing, and the multiple crossings of multiple thresholds will
require a different kind of adaptation.
Moreover, radical changes in the ecological systems will likely trigger tipping
points in social systems, as well. As a startling example, at the extreme temperature
increase of 7.5°C that could occur under a business-as-usual scenario with no mitigation,
by 2070 one-third of the world’s population would exist in an annual temperature range
presently found on only 0.8% of the world’s land mass, mostly in the Saharan desert, if

Celine Guivarch & Stephane Hallegatte, 2C or not 2C?, 23 GLOBAL ENVT’L CHANGE 179, 18086 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.10.006 (summarizing the growing perspective that 2ºC
is not attainable).
24
For a discussion of evidence supporting this assessment, see infra Part I.
25
For detail on climate sensitivity, see infra Part I.C.
26
Guivarch & Hallegatte, supra note 23, at 186.
27
J.B.
Ruhl,
Schrödinger’s
Climate,
JDSUPRA
(May
19,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/schrodinger-s-climate-32775/.
28
The concern is that as the 2°C target loses credibility, adhering to it undermines international
negotiations and, worse, would lead to insufficient mitigation measures. Guivarch & Hallegatte, supra note
23, at 179.
29
Will Steffen et al., supra note 8, at 8253-54 & fig. 2.
23
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they remained in situ.30 It is unlikely they all would remain in situ, meaning that mass
human (and other species) migration is a significant adaptation issue. Adaptation at every
level of warming thus is best thought of as evolving in interdependent social-ecological
systems, and this evolutionary dynamic will become more intense and rapid above 2°C.
To be effective, adaptation thus cannot continue to be conceptualized as an incrementally
linear extrapolation of current efforts if social-ecological systems undergo nonlinear
change beyond 2°C.31
As suggested above, however, the unified vision binding adaption and mitigation
policy together has kept adaptation policy and planning focused on a 2°C future. As we
outline in Part III, this unified vision of a 2°C future has played out in adaptation policy
in the United States and many other nations through three interconnected modes of
adaptation deployed primarily at the local scale.32 The first is, where practicable, to resist
the impacts of climate change, such as by constructing hard sea walls to fend of rising sea
levels. The second is to build the resilience of social-ecological systems to the harms of
climate change, such as by improving urban capacity to respond to heat waves. The third
mode is to retreat from unavoidable impacts, such as in areas where coastal resistance
using sea walls is not practical. Using these “Three Rs,” conventional adaptation policy
is envisions the end product of as something close to life before warming and,
importantly, in the same place.
As the prospect of holding temperature increase to under 2°C erodes, however, in
situ adaptation using the Three Rs can no longer remain the presumed norm. Many human
beings and the complex social-ecological systems in which they currently exist, including
in the United States, will not be able to remain in their same configurations in the same
locations in a “beyond 2°C” world.33 As these risks become realities, the Three Rs are
unlikely to be sufficient, and they may even be futile in some regions of the nation.34 In
short, moving past 2°C will require adding a fourth climate change adaptation mode—
redesign. By “redesign,” we mean transformational adaptation measures as radical as the
pace and intensity of changing conditions beyond 2°C, measures that will be needed to
reconfigure and relocate our nation’s population distribution, land uses, infrastructure,
economic and production networks, natural resource management, and other social,
ecological, and technological systems.35 The redesign adaptation mode anticipates,
responds to, designs, and facilitates this relocation and reconception of population,
infrastructure, agriculture, and other social-ecological system components.

30

Chi Xu, Timothy A. Kohler, Timothy M. Lenton, Jens-Christian Svenning, & Marten Scheffer
Future
of
the
Human
Climate
Niche,
117
PNAS
11350,
11350
(2020),
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1910114117.
31
Mark Stafford Smith, Lisa Horrocks, Alex Harvey & Clive Hamilton, Rethinking Adaptation
for a 4°C World, 369 PHIL. TRANS. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 196, 196 (2011),
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2010.0277 (“Adapting to global warming of 4°C cannot be seen as a mere
extrapolation of adaptation to 2°C; it will be a more substantial, continuous and transformative process”).
32
For descriptions of each, see infra Part II.A
33
For a discussion of these and other likely impacts, see infra Part II.
34
For a discussion of the growing body of research on this theme, see infra Part III.
35
For a discussion of the redesign adaptation mode, see infra Part III.C.
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As much as the resist, resilience, and retreat adaptation modes have posed difficult
governance challenges already,36 the governance stakes in a 4°C world that requires the
redesign mode of adaptation are potentially existential. Among the social systems subject
to massive disruption and in need of adaptation, therefore, governance systems are of
foremost concern. If redesign is not governed effectively, people will be more than angry
with their governments. To avoid or minimize that disruption, engaging now in
anticipatory adaptation to a world that will see more than a 2°C increase in global average
temperature, while not costless, will give human societies like the United States the best
chance of avoiding a breakdown in democratic governance.
The question this Article thus engages, perhaps quixotically, is: What does
democratic governance of a 4°C world look like? We set out through this Article to begin
a robust dialog about how governance in the United States can adapt to successfully cope
with that scenario, where “success” means: (1) adapting to extreme climate change as a
nation without transitioning our system of governance to either authoritarianism or
tribalism; while (2) providing opportunities and support for those individuals and
communities that otherwise face significant risks of being ignored, overrun, forgotten,
left behind, or otherwise further marginalized; and (3) still striving to improve the
resilience of the ecological components of the many social-ecological systems that we
inhabit; and (4) building and retaining the capacity to continue adapting democratic
governance to perpetually evolving social-ecological conditions. This is a tall order, to
be sure, but if success in the face of daunting global conditions can be condensed to the
goal of “staying in the game,”37 these four conditions seem necessary.
To frame and spark such a dialog, this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I surveys
the contemporary science showing why the 2°C goal is likely no longer feasible and a
4°C world is a real possibility. Part II leverages scientific projections of conditions at
beyond 2°C to envision the 4°C world, including how it plays out across the United States,
albeit recognizing there are key uncertainties in those projections. Part III outlines the
current Three Rs adaptation policy modes and makes the case that, while they will
continue to be necessary beyond 2°C, they will be insufficient to handle the scope and
intensity of necessary adaptations. It then introduces the redesign modality of adaptation.
Building on this foundation, Part IV translates the foregoing into two policy
typologies to facilitate design of law and policy for anticipatory governance of climate
change adaptation for the 4°C world. One typology describes different redesign
challenges based on three modes of change—linear, nonlinear, and cascading. The other
typology outlines different possible governance responses, ranging from allowing private
markets to guide adaptation to centralized top-down planning. Part IV then merges the
two typologies to identify scenarios that must be anticipated when designing adaptation
governance responses. This analysis leads to the conclusion that, for many redesign
challenges, the United States may be best served by a coordinated national plan akin to
36

Mark T. Gibbs, Why Is Coastal Retreat So Hard to Implement? Understanding the Political
Risk of Coastal Adaptation Pathways, 130 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 107, 108-12 (2016),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2016.06.002 (describing the controversies surrounding the retreat
mode).
37
Joseph A. Tainter, Social Complexity and Sustainability, 3 ECOL. COMPLEXITY 91, 100 (2006),
doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2005.07.004.
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the mobilization that occurred at the start of World War II. Part V concludes with
suggestions for how a creation of a national science and policy research “foresight
system” can begin to lay foundations for designing such an anticipatory national planning
initiative.
Put bluntly, if the mounting body of science pointing in the direction of moving
beyond 2°C proves to be correct, it would behoove our nation to have begun envisioning
how to “stay in the game” well before we cross the 2°C threshold. To do otherwise—to
count on the description herein of what lies ahead turning out to be wrong, or on society
to design effective solutions on the fly if it turns out to be right—is a gamble we consider
not worth taking.
I. EMBRACING 4°C: WHY 2°C IS TOO CONSERVATIVE FOR ANTICIPATORY
ADAPTATION GOVERNANCE
As noted in the Introduction, this Article’s science-based central premise is that it
is highly unlikely that the world will achieve its “below 2°C” goals for global average
warming. This Part defends that premise, providing an overview of the science regarding
the world’s likely climate change future. It begins with the planet’s current temperature
and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration status, as well as an overview of trends. It
then explores the more complicated issue of what humans would have to do to keep global
average temperature below 2°C, recognizing that such projections are made in a context
of uncertainty and best-guesses but nevertheless concluding that any such efforts are
unlikely to succeed.
A. Where Are We Now? The Current Increase and Trends in Global Average
Temperature
The year 2019 was the second hottest year on record, at least at the moment we
are composing this Article.38 In that year, global average temperature was already 1.15°C
(2.07°F) above the pre-Industrial average.39 In other words, the planet is already more
than 76% of the way to being 1.5°C warmer, on average, or 57.5% of the way to being
2°C warmer.
More ominously, “[t]he global annual temperature has increased at an average
rate of 0.07°C (0.13°F) per decade since 1880 and over twice that rate (+0.18°C /
+0.32°F) since 1981.”40 At the current rates of increase, global average temperatures will
be 1.5°C warmer than pre-industrial levels by 204041 and 2°C warmer by roughly 2067.
However, the rates of warming are also still accelerating, and “[e]stimated anthropogenic
38

Rebecca Lindsey & LuAnn Dahlman, Climate Change: Global Temperature, NOAA
CLIMATE.GOV (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climatechange-global-temperature.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
In 2018, for example, the IPCC concluded that “[g]lobal warming is likely to reach 1.5°C
between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. 2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note
19, at 4.
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global warming is currently increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per
decade due to past and ongoing emissions (high confidence).”42
As bad as that story is, global average temperature increases are not always the
most relevant numbers for climate adaptation governance. As the IPCC observed in 2018,
“Warming greater than the global annual average is being experienced in many land
regions and seasons, including two to three times higher in the Arctic.”43 Of particular
relevance, temperatures over land surfaces, where most people live, are increasing faster
than global average temperature, which is moderated by the ocean’s capacity to absorb
heat.44 The IPCC reported in 2019 that mean land surface air temperature “has risen
considerably more than the global mean surface (land and ocean) temperature” and has
already reached 1.53°C.45 Vividly illustrating this effect, in 2019 the Washington Post
compiled multiple data sources to produce a map showing that over one-fifth of the globe
has already experienced a 2°C rise, and all of the United States west of the Mississippi
River plus a large swath of the Southeast has already experienced a 1.5°C rise.46 Much of
the terrestrial world, in other words, has already exceeded the more ambitious of the
world’s climate change mitigation goals.
B. Can We Stay Below 2°C? Carbon Budgets, Coronavirus, and Uncertainty
Given where conditions stand now, how realistic is the 2°C ceiling mitigation
goal? This depends on three factors: (1) the prospect of substantially and rapidly reducing
global net emissions; (2) the total additional emissions that can be accepted before
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations push temperatures past 2°C; and (3) the range
of uncertainty in both those calculations. Based on current models, none of these factors
bodes well for meeting the 2°C climate mitigation goal.47
1. Emissions Cuts Sufficient to Halt Warming Are Unlikely
Reducing anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, while a necessary first step,
is not enough to immediately stop climate change. Carbon dioxide lingers in the
atmosphere for a long time—on the order of centuries.48 Climate change will be an issue
as long as atmospheric CO2 concentrations remain high, trapping more heat close to the
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
LAND 9 (Aug. 2019) [hereinafter 2019 IPCC LAND REPORT].
46
Chris Mooney & John Muyskens, 2°C: Beyond the Limit, WASH. POST (Sept 11, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/climate-environment/climate-changeworld/?itid=lk_inline_manual_1&itid=lk_inline_manual_1&itid=lk_interstitial_manual_6.
47
For a similar assessment, leading to the conclusion that extensive private institution responses
will be needed in addition to public governance, see MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M.
GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 37-63 (2017)
(after an assessment of policy and climate science, concluding “We are pessimistic about the possibility of
meeting the 2°C goal.”). While we agree that private institutions will play an important role in climate
mitigation and adaptation, our focus herein is on public adaptation governance.
48
2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
43
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Earth’s surface. Reversing the process significantly enough to quickly change the planet’s
warming processes will require herculean efforts by the world’s nations over the next two
to three decades—an unlikely future recently made more unlikely by the fact that nations
are likely to prioritize economic and social recovery as the coronavirus pandemic
eventually recedes.
Two simultaneous phenomena during the coronavirus epidemic make this point
real. First, as a result of the Spring 2020 global lockdowns during the pandemic, the world
experienced “one of the biggest single drops in modern history in the amount of carbon
dioxide humans emit. Over the first few months of 2020, global daily CO2 emissions
averaged about 17 percent lower than in 2019. At the moments of the most restrictive and
extensive lockdowns, emissions in some countries hovered nearly 30 percent below last
year’s averages . . . .”49 Nevertheless, in May 2020, the world hit a record 418 parts per
million atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide. Without the coronavirus-induced
drop in emissions, it would only have been roughly 418.4 parts per million.50 The
seemingly huge drops in emissions had only a small effect on slowing—and did not come
anywhere close to reversing—the buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.
Researchers now conclude that the significant emissions cuts during COVID-19 mean
that the planet will be only 0.005 to 0.015°C cooler in 2030 than it otherwise would have
been if the pandemic had not occurred.51
Thus, even at the height of coronavirus restrictions, we were still putting carbon
dioxide into the atmosphere faster than it could cycle back out. As a result, “even though
emissions have dropped, CO2 is still going into the atmosphere and it will still accumulate
there, just as it has since humans started burning vast amounts of fossil fuels.”52 As one
scientist put it, “The buildup of CO2 is a bit like trash in a landfill. As we keep emitting,
it keeps piling up.”53 Only radical reductions in the “trash” can stop the “landfill” from
rising further.
Reducing the “trash” will require unprecedented political, social, economic, and
technological transformations. In the IPCC’s analysis, for example:
In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, global net anthropogenic
CO2 emissions [must] decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60%
interquartile range), reaching net zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile
range). For limiting global warming to below 2°C CO2 emissions are projected to
decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–30% interquartile range) and
reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 interquartile range).54
Alejandra Borunda, “Plunge in carbon emissions from lockdowns will not slow climate change,”
NAT’L GEO. (May 20, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/05/plunge-in-carbonemissions-lockdowns-will-not-slow-climate-change/#close.
50
Id.
51
Piers M. Forster, Harriet I. Forster, Mat J. Evans, Matthew J. Gidden, Chris D. Jones, Christoph
A. Keller, Robin D. Lamboll, Corinne Le Quéré, Joeri Rogelj, Deborah Rosen, Carl-Friedrich Schleussner,
Thomas B. Richardson, Christopher J. Smith, and Steven T. Turnock, Current and future global climate
change impacts from COVID-19, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 913 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0883-0.
52
Borunda, supra note 49.
53
CO2 Levels Reach Record High, THE WEEK, June 26, 2020, at 19.
54
2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 19, at 12.
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In other words, to make a real difference, “[e]missions must fall 7.6 percent—in line with
the worst-case lockdown scenario for 2020—every year this decade to ensure the 1.5C
cap, unless other means are found to remove carbon from the atmosphere… .”55 If past
performance is any guide, the world is unlikely to sustain these pandemic-driven
emissions cuts, which were for all practical purposes forced upon societies.56
In the context of this Article, it is also worth noting that achieving the 1.5°C
mitigation goal requires significant societal transformations, although lesser in magnitude
and complexity than what we foresee as becoming necessary on the adaptation side at
3°C to 4°C.57 As the IPCC expounded,
Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot would
require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban infrastructure
(including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high confidence).
These systems transitions are unprecedented in terms of scale, but not necessarily
in terms of speed, and imply deep emissions reductions in all sectors, a wide
portfolio of mitigation options and a significant upscaling of investments in those
options.58

The most critical of these social transitions is weaning energy production and
consumption off of fossil fuels.59 As the Pathways to Deep Decarbonization project
outlines,60 a three-pronged strategy must be adopted for an energy transition scenario to
succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions at levels and in time frames needed to
contain climate change to a 2°C scenario: “(1) highly efficient end use of energy in
buildings, transportation, and industry; (2) decarbonization of electricity and other fuels;
and (3) fuel switching of end uses to electricity and other low-carbon supplies.”61 These
55

Global CO2 emissions could fall 7 percent in 2020 due to Covid-19, study shows, FRANCE24
(May 20, 2020, 09:38), https://www.france24.com/en/20200520-co2-emissions-could-fall-7-percent-in2020-due-to-covid-19-study-shows (emphasis added) (referring to Corinne Le Quere et al., Temporary
Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 647 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0797-x).
56
New et al., supra note 20, at 8-9 (summarizing various lines of research indicating that the
emissions cuts required to stay below 2°C of warming are virtually impossible). See also Peter Christoff,
Introduction: Four Degrees or More?, in FOUR DEGREES OF GLOBAL WARMING: AUSTRALIA IN A HOT
WORLD (Peter Christoff, ed.) at 1 (Routledge 2014) (noting that “there is widespread agreement that current
mitigation efforts . . . will lead to global average warming of 4°C or more from pre-industrial levels by the
end of this century . . .”).
57
See Frank W. Geels, Benjamin K. Sovacool, Tim Schwanen, & Steve Sorrell, Sociotechnical
Transitions for Deep Decarbonization, 357 SCI. 1242, 1242-44 (2017), DOI: 10.1126/science.aao3760.
58
2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 19, at 15.
59
For extensive discussions and references on this theme, see John C. Dernbach, Legal Pathways
to Deep Decarbonization: Postscript, 48 ENVT’L L. REP. 10875, 10881-84 (2018); Michael B. Gerrard,
Legal Pathways for a Massive Increase in Utility-Scale Renewable Generation Capacity, 47 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10591, 10592 (2017); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, What Happens When the Green New Deal Meets
the Old Green Laws, 44 VT. L. REV. 693, 701-13 (2020).
60
See JAMES H. WILLIAMS ET AL, PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(2014), https://usddpp.org/downloads/2014-technical-report.pdf.
61
Id. at xv (emphasis added). See also THE WHITE HOUSE, MID-CENTURY STRATEGY FOR DEEP
DECARBONIZATION 7 (2015) (aiming to “transition[ ] to a low-carbon energy system, by cutting energy
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changes will require rapid and massive national initiatives. On the energy production side,
for example, estimates using a “high renewables” reference case frame a range of between
1,350 and 2,500 gigawatts of new wind and solar renewable power generating capacity
that must come online in the United States between today and 2050 to meet Paris Accord
goals—an amount roughly 15 to 30 times the present wind and solar generating
capacity.62 However, there is no evidence that global greenhouse gas emission levels have
peaked and turned the corner.63 Report after report issued in 2019 confirmed that there is
little to suggest that emission reduction goals set through various international and
domestic institutions are on track to be achieved.64 Even the most climate-progressive
states and cities in the United States are falling behind.65
Although we know what needs to be done, making the energy transformation and
other necessary social changes needed to wrestle emissions under control requires
overcoming “the interlinked mix of technologies, infrastructures, markets, regulations,
and use practices that together deliver societal functions.”66 The resistance to change has
become a sobering reality, as estimates of the massive technology and social
transformation campaigns needed to stabilize climate made as recently as 2004 were soon

waste, decarbonizing the electricity system and deploying clean electricity and low carbon fuels in the
transportation, buildings, and industrial sectors”) (emphasis omitted), https://unfccc.int/files/focus/longterm_strategies/application/pdf/mid_century_strategy_report-final_red.pdf. There is growing concern that
even these initiatives, if achieved, will not suffice, and that carbon dioxide removal technologies must be
developed to facilitate net negative emissions. See An Equitable Path to Net-Zero Emissions, NATURE, Dec.
5, 2019, at 7; Negative Emissions: The Chronic Complexity of Carbon Capture, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 2019,
at 22.
62
See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 61, at 4 (estimating an additional 30 GW per year between 2016
and 2035, totaling 600 GW, and then an additional 60 GW per year between 2035 and 2050, totaling 750
GW, for an estimated total of 1,350 additional GW); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 60, at vii (estimating an
additional 2,500 GW, representing 30 times the current capacity).
63
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 61, at 4.
64
U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019, at xiv-xv (2019) (noting that
global greenhouse gas emissions rose on average 1.5 % annually over the past decade and “[t]here is no
sign of GHG emissions peaking in the next few years”); ROBERT WATSON ET AL., FEU-US, THE TRUTH
BEHIND THE CLIMATE PLEDGES i (2019), https://feu-us.org/behind-the-climate-pledges/ (“An analysis of
current commitments to reduce emissions between 2020 and 2030 shows that almost 75 percent of the
climate pledges are partially or totally insufficient to contribute to reducing GHG emissions by 50 percent
by 2030, and some of these pledges are unlikely to be achieved.”).
65
For U.S. states, see CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, GETTING GREENER: COST EFFECTIVE OPTIONS
FOR
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NEW
YORK
STATE’S
GREENHOUSE
GAS
GOALS
1-2
(2019),
https://cbcny.org/sites/default/files/media/files/REPORT_GettingGreener_120602019.pdf
(identifying
obstacles to achieving emission reduction goals); NEXT 10, CALIFORNIA GREEN INNOVATION INDEX 4
(2019) (“California will reach its 2030 and 2050 goals in 2061 and 2157, respectively— representing a 31year and a 107-year delay.”), https://www.next10.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/2019-california-greeninnovation-index-final.pdf. For U.S. cities, see Sam Markolf, Ines M.L. Azevedo, Mark Muro, & David G.
Victor, Pledges and Progress: Steps Toward Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions in the 100 Largest
Cities
Across
the
United
States,
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE
(Oct.
20,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/pledges-and-progress-steps-toward-greenhouse-gas-emissionsreductions-in-the-100-largest-cities-across-the-united-states/ (two-thirds of US cities that have adopted
emissions reduction targets are falling short of meeting them); Jeffrey Brainard, News in Brief: U.S. Cities
Labor to Cut Emissions, 370 SCI. 508, 509 (2020), DOI: 10.1126/science.370.6516.508 (same).
66
Geels et al., supra note 57, at 1242.
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after shown to fall significantly short of what will be needed.67 More recent proposed
“roadmaps” to deep decarbonization outline no less than herculean policy efforts and
technological breakthroughs, none of which is yet even on the horizon.68 The world’s
continuing inability to tackle these transformations on the mitigation side gives credence
to our concerns for 4°C adaptation governance.
2. Carbon Budgets Also Suggest that the 2°C Mitigation Goal Is Unrealistic
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations indicate that the planet already is committed to
warming that exceeds 2°C, and even the coronavirus pandemic was insufficient to keep
those concentrations from continuing to increase. Other metrics tell a similar tale. For
example, another way to think about the 1.5°C/2°C climate mitigation goal is to ask how
much of a carbon budget we have left—that is, how much more CO2 can we add to the
atmosphere and still have a reasonable chance of keeping warming to less than 1.5° or
2°C above pre-industrial levels? The IPCC, for example, stated in 2018 that accumulated
anthropogenic carbon emissions to that point were unlikely sufficient to push global
average warming past 1.5°C within this century.69 However, those emissions did not stop,
or reach “net zero,”70 in 2018, raising the issue of how much more leeway humanity has.
Carbon budget estimates mean little in the abstract: what does one gigatonne (billion
tonnes, or Gt) really mean in terms of human activity? To put the following discussion of
estimates in perspective, in 2019 global energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide
flattened after two years of increases to 33 Gt,71 but the total global emissions still
increased, reaching 36.81 Gt.72 As a rough rule of thumb, the IPCC estimates total global
CO2 emissions to be 42 Gt per year, give or take 3 Gt (i.e., 39-45 Gt per year).73
Even within the uncertain and probability-based world of climate change
projections, carbon budgets deserve a place of honor for lack of certainty and variability.
As a result, the following discussion seeks to “ballpark” best-case and worst-case
estimates. Nevertheless, the bottom line is clear: A business-as-usual world will eat up
even the 2°C carbon budget within a few decades.
According to the IPCC in 2014, as of 2011, in order to have a two-thirds chance
of staying below a 2°C increase in global average warming, a total of 1000 gigatonnes
more of carbon dioxide or its equivalent, give or take a couple hundred gigatonnes, can
67

Steven J Davis, Long Cao, Ken Caldeira, & Martin I Hoffert, Rethinking Wedges, 8 ENVTL.
RESEARCH LETT. 01101, at 1-2 (2013), doi:10.1088/1748-9326/8/1/011001; see also generally Eli Kintisch,
Climate Study Highlights Wedge Issue, 339 SCI. 128, 128-29 (2013), DOI: 10.1126/science.339.6116.128
(summarizing the study).
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See, e.g., Johan Rockström et al., A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 355 SCI. 1269, 127071 (2017), DOI: 10.1126/science.aah3443.
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2018 IPCC 1.5°C REPORT, supra note 19, at 5.
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Id.
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Global CO2 Emissions in 2019, INTL. ENERGY AGENCY (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.iea.org/articles/global-co2-emissions-in-2019.
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be added to the atmosphere—ever.74 Keep in mind, first, that the 2°C goal is not
guaranteed even if that budget is met; indeed, the odds of losing are twice as bad as in
Russian Roulette. Second, even within the IPCC’s constraints, the actual number of
gigatonnes might be 12.0% lower—or 8.6% higher—than its median estimate.
Even so, leaving all the caveats aside, and using the IPCC’s median limit of 2900
Gt total, humanity had 1000 Gt left at the end of 2011 to have a 66% chance of keeping
global warming to 2°C. Assuming roughly 40 Gt per year, by the end of 2019, humans
had already emitted another 320 Gt.75 That left 680 Gt to go. At the 40 Gt pace, we will
miss even our two-thirds chance of staying below 2°C by around 2036. The IPCC’s 2018
carbon budget, which focused on the 1.5°C goal, was only slightly more favorable,
suggesting that the world in 2018 might be able to emit only 420 Gt more of carbon
dioxide to have a two-thirds chance of staying below 1.5ºC. That allows roughly 10 more
years under business as usual, or until somewhere between 2028 and 2030.76
Individual carbon budget studies exhibit even more variation. Between 2016 and 2018,
experts produced nine different studies trying to calculate humanity’s remaining carbon
budget to keep global average temperature increases below 1.5°C. Assessments of these
nine studies concluded that “the remaining carbon budget to limit warming to ‘well
below’ 1.5°C might have already been exceeded by emissions to-date, or might be as
large as 15 more years of emissions at our current rate.”77 In short, at best the budget is
used up by 2033. Even if a slim budget remains, however, the CO2 emissions committed
from existing fossil fuel power plants and those currently planned, permitted, and under
construction (which are mostly in China and India) will alone consume the entire CO 2
budget that remains to limit warming to 1.5°C.78 Worse still, another study concluded
that even if all fossil fuel emissions were immediately halted, “current trends in global
food systems would prevent the achievement of the 1.5°C target and, by the end of the
century, threaten the achievement of the 2.0°C target.”79 Thus, business-as-usual in
energy and food alone could doubly blow past the 2.0°C mitigation target.
To complicate matters still further, the foregoing carbon budget analyses are
limited to anthropogenic emissions, which are not the only source of greenhouse gasses.
As climate change forces ecological systems across nonlinear thresholds of
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transformation (discussed in Part II), historically sequestered greenhouse gases will be
released. As scientists reported in Nature in late 2019:
The world’s remaining emissions budget for a 50:50 chance of staying within
1.5 °C of warming is only about 500 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2. Permafrost emissions
could take an estimated 20% (100 Gt CO2) off this budget, and that’s without
including methane from deep permafrost or undersea hydrates. If forests are close
to tipping points, Amazon dieback could release another 90 Gt CO2 and boreal
forests a further 110 Gt CO2. With global total CO2 emissions still at more than
40 Gt per year, the remaining budget could be all but erased already.80

This ecological contribution to climate change only gets worse as we move past 2C, as
“huge swaths of the world’s tropical forests will begin to lose more carbon than they
accumulate. Already, the hottest forests in South America have reached that point.”81 In
addition, Arctic lakes have been observed releasing large bubbles of methane—enough
to fuel pillars of flame over the water’s surface when set alight—since at least 2018.82
These lakes, looking eerily like the MacBeth witches’ bubbling cauldron, may be the first
signs that Arctic feedback loops are now in motion, accelerating greenhouse gas
emissions, climate change, and any chance of staying within the carbon budget for even
2°C.83 In the Arctic Ocean itself, new research indicates that lunar and tidal cycles play
important roles in methane gas release, leading to underestimates of how much of this
greenhouse gas the Arctic is currently emitting.84 Looking more broadly than just direct
human-generated emissions, therefore, we probably have already consumed the 2C
budget regardless of whether anthropogenic emissions are controlled.
C. Where Are We Going? Committed Warming and Projections for Global Average
Temperatures
Predicting future increases in global average temperature by necessity requires
making educated guesses about how a variety of variables, both human and planetary,
will actually play out in the future. These variables include the rate at which and extent
to which the energy system is decarbonized (i.e., the conversion to renewable and nuclear
power), human population growth, patterns of consumerism, when and to what extent the
ocean’s capacity to absorb carbon dioxide will slow or stop, the extent to which melting
ice will accelerate warming by exposing dark surfaces, and many more. The variety of
guesses that climate modelers make goes a long way to explaining the variety of
80
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predictions that exist about how warm the planet will become—and how fast.
Nevertheless, most scenarios agree that the planet is well on its way to a 4ºC increase in
global average temperature, which could occur as soon as 50 years from now.
The IPCC, for example, most consistently compares four scenarios.85 Its businessas-usual scenarios tend to suggest that the world could reach 4°C by the end of this
century.86 In 2017, researchers using a different methodology published their projections
in Nature, concluding that by 2100 “[t]he likely range of global temperature increase is
2.0-4.9°C, with a median of 3.2°C . . . .”87
The breadth of that range is attributable to uncertainty regarding how fast and how
much our climate responds to changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations—
known as climate sensitivity.88 The benchmark for assessment is the expected range of
increase in temperature at 560 ppm, which is double the pre-industrial concentration and
roughly 145 ppm above the current level.89 One of the first assessments, a 1979 study by
the National Research Council, produced a broad range of 1.5℃ to 4.5℃.90 Recent
efforts to tighten the range do not bode well. The most comprehensive study, published
in 2019, weaves together contemporary warming trends, the latest understanding of
climate system feedback loops and other dynamics, and studies of ancient climates.91 The
study concludes that at 560 ppm the likely (66% chance) warming range is between 2.6℃
and 3.9℃.92 The study was unable to rule out that the sensitivity could be above 4.5°C
per doubling of carbon dioxide levels, although this is not likely.93 In other words, barring
rapid global political, social, and technological transformations of the breadth and depth
discussed above, we will be fortunate to limit temperature rise to 2.6℃, just as likely to
reach 3.9℃, and the possibility of reaching 4.0℃ or higher cannot be ignored.
Importantly for adaptation governance, however, warming doesn’t stop in 2100,
nor is 560 ppm a naturally-imposed ceiling on concentrations. In May 2020, “the
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere crept up to about 418 parts per million.
It was the highest ever recorded in human history and likely higher than at any point in
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the last three million years.”94 The increasing concentration of carbon dioxide already
accumulated in the atmosphere—the planet’s response to which constitutes an important
source of uncertainty regarding how fast the planet will warm—represents “committed
warming,” a future of global average temperature increases even if all new emissions
cease tomorrow (unless technology is developed to actively draw CO2 back out of the
atmosphere on massive scale). According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the last time carbon dioxide concentrations were over 400 ppm
(three million years ago), “temperature was 2°–3°C (3.6°–5.4°F) higher than during the
pre-industrial era, and sea level was 15–25 meters (50–80 feet) higher than today.”95
Given the delays involved in atmospheric dynamics, humans thus probably have already
committed the planet to a future that blows right by the 2°C warming goal. Moreover, for
more than a decade now, the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere has been increasing
roughly 2.3 ppm per year.96 At that rate, the concentration will be roughly 485 ppm by
2050 and at the doubling threshold of 560 ppm by around 2080. From there, by 2100 the
2.0℃ mitigation target will be a historical footnote.
II. ANTICIPATING 4°C: WHAT DOES THE WORLD LOOK LIKE BEYOND 2°C?
Climate change is, well, change—an expression of all the accumulated extra
energy (mostly in the form of heat) working on the planet’s various physical, chemical,
and biological systems at all scales simultaneously. Envisioning governance of the
United States at 4ºC requires policymakers and adaptation planners to imagine not a
future stable state of being in a hotter world but rather a continual and accelerating
process of discontinuous and often unpredictable transformation. Indeed, even leaving
the coronavirus pandemic to the side for the moment, Americans are already
experiencing an accelerating pace of natural disasters and extreme inconveniences,
lurching from wildfires to hurricanes to drought to “Polar Vortex” winters to severe
flooding.97 Species are already migrating poleward and higher in altitude (terrestrial) or
deeper in depth (marine), which is rearranging ecosystems, perturbing food webs
(including humans’), and changing fisheries world-wide, among other disruptions to
natural systems upon which humans depend.98
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These experiences will only get worse, challenging the abilities of governance
institutions to provide—or perhaps even define—the sense of stability necessary for
social-ecological systems to productively adapt to their new reality. To paint a more vivid
picture of that challenge, in this section we summarize the scientific evidence of looming
nonlinear change to the planet and the limits of human adaptive capacity, then use that
background to envision conditions in the United States under a 4°C scenario.
A. Coming to Grips with Nonlinear Change
The tendency among nonscientists when thinking about global warming is to
think in linear terms: if X amount of damage occurs with 1°C of warming, then 2X
damage will occur at 2°C of warming, 3X at 3°C, and so on. That would be bad enough,
but a fundamental truth about a rapidly warming planet is that the impacts from a steadily
increasing mean global average temperature are nonlinear, and in two senses. First, the
amount of change occurring is often geometric, with each increment of warming
multiplying and accelerating, rather than simply adding, impacts. Second, at some point
the changes become transformative, fundamentally altering social-ecological systems
into new states of being. To make matters even more chaotic, different systems transform
at different temperatures. Some, like Arctic and coral reef social-ecological systems, are
already transforming.99 Others, like mangrove social-ecological systems, currently face
far less risk.100 It does not take much—the decline of a top-level predator because of
temperature or the expansion of another predator’s range—to throw ecological systems
into cascade transformations.101
Thus, as the IPCC has emphasized, even the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C is
important when thinking about future adaptation governance.102 For example,
temperature extremes at specific locations change more rapidly than the global average,
so that “extreme hot days in mid-latitudes warm by up to about 3°C at global warming
of 1.5°C and about 4°C at 2°C, and extreme cold nights in high latitudes warm by up to
about 4.5°C at 1.5°C and about 6°C at 2°C.”103 Thus, the 0.5°C change in global average
temperature from 1.5°C to 2°C makes the hottest days a full 1°C hotter and the hottest
nights 1.5°C hotter—an example of geometric impacts.104 Half a degree Celsius also
99
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average air temperature on the Antarctic Peninsula increased by 4°C. Antarctic contribution to SLR since
1992 is about 8mm. That will accelerate if temps keep rising. Robin E. Bell & Helene Seroussi, History,
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1154, 1154-55 (2020), DOI: 10.1126/science.369.6508.1154; Douglas B. Rasher et al., Keystone Predators
Govern the Pathway and Pace of Impacts In a Subarctic Marine Ecosystem, 369 SCI. 1351, 1351-54 (2020),
DOI: 10.1126/science.aav7515.
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See also New et al., supra note 20, at 10 (“The broadly constant ratio of local climate change
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makes a dramatic difference to the Arctic: “With 1.5°C of global warming, one sea icefree Arctic summer is projected per century. This likelihood is increased to at least one
per decade with 2°C global warming.”105 Here, a 0.5°C difference in the increase in
global average temperature leads to a ten-fold increase in impacts. Similarly, as global
average temperature increases arithmetically, a geometrically accelerating percentage of
species are affected: “Of 105,000 species studied, 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of
vertebrates are projected to lose over half of their climatically determined geographic
range for global warming of 1.5°C, compared with 18% of insects, 16% of plants and 8%
of vertebrates for global warming of 2°C (medium confidence).”106
These nonlinear trajectories continue past 2C, making a world at 4C one in
which the risks associated with natural disasters and ecological failure are global in scope
and unimaginably intense compared to the present. For example, a recent comprehensive
study of 30 different impacts of climate change concluded that:
the global average chance of a major heatwave increases from 5% in 1981–2010
to 28% at 1.5 °C and 92% at 4°C, of an agricultural drought increases from 9 to
24% at 1.5°C and 61% at 4°C, and of the 50-year return period river flood increases
from 2 to 2.4% at 1.5°C and 5.4% at 4°C. The chance of a damaging hot spell for
maize increases from 5 to 50% at 4°C, whilst the chance for rice rises from 27 to
46%.107

These increasing risks are, obviously, likely to be costly to human life and to
economies. While not at the heart of where the worst damage will occur, the United States
is by no means out of harm’s way, and projections suggest that climate change will subject
it to substantial hits to economic activity and surges in mortality.108 For all practical
purposes, planning and policy in such an environment will need to assume that
debilitating heatwaves, drought, crop failure, floods, and other harms are the new
normal.109
An important reason why conditions get so much worse beyond 2C is that more
and more biophysical systems begin crossing tipping points as temperatures keep
rising.110 Many ecosystems are already crossing transformational tipping point thresholds
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William A. Pizer, What’s the Damage from Climate Change?, 356 SCI. 1330, 1330-31 (2017), DOI:
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at 1.0°C of warming,111 but the number of those systems undergoing transformations
accelerates by 2°C and continues to expand from there:
Approximately 4% (interquartile range 2–7%) of the global terrestrial land area is
projected to undergo a transformation of ecosystems from one type to another at
1°C of global warming, compared with 13% (interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C
(medium confidence). This indicates that the area at risk is projected to be
approximately 50% lower at 1.5°C compared to 2°C (medium confidence).112

One way to look at these estimates is that the number of ecosystems transforming
approximately triples with each 1°C of warming. If that relationship holds, then at 3°C
about 39% of ecosystems will be transforming, and somewhere before 4°C of warming
all of them will be.113
We are well on the way there. Pervasive shifts in forest vegetation are already
occurring and are likely to accelerate under future global changes.114 Most at risk are
tropical forests, which are already exhibiting nonlinear, unpredictable trajectories of
change in structure and diversity.115 Diverse terrestrial and marine species are exhibiting
poleward range extensions and changes in abundance and distribution.116 Rising carbon
reduces the nutrients in plants, which is already dwindling terrestrial insect
populations.117 All herbivores are at risk if this trend continues. In many systems,

There are a range of other potential thresholds in the climate system and large ecosystems that
might be crossed as the world warms from 2C to 4C and beyond. These include permanent
absence of summer sea ice in the Arctic, loss of the large proportion of reef-building tropical
corals, melting of permafrost at rates that result in positive feedbacks to greenhouse gas warming
through CH4 and CO2 releases and die-back of the Amazon forest. While the locations of these
thresholds are not precisely defined, it is clear that the risk of these transitions occurring is much
larger at 4◦C—and so the nature of the changes in climate we experience may well start shifting
from incremental to transformative.
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nonlinear effects accelerate the pace of transformation.118 Projections suggest that shifts
in Earth ecosystems are likely to occur over “human” timescales of years and decades,
meaning the collapse of large vulnerable ecosystems, such as the Amazon rainforest and
Caribbean coral reefs, may take only a few decades once triggered.119
Although other systems will take longer to transform, once they cross thresholds
of nonlinear change the transformation will for all practical purposes be irreversible. For
example, under a sustained warming scenario, a threshold for the integrity of the Antarctic
ice shelves, and thus of the stability of the ice sheet, seems to lie between 1.5C and 2C.
Crossing these thresholds implies commitment to large ice sheet changes and sea level
rise that may take thousands of years to be fully realized and may be irreversible on longer
time scales.120 Similar concerns are coming from research on ocean circulation
systems.121 In short, almost everywhere researchers explore, they are finding evidence of
a changing world increasingly dominated by accelerating nonlinear effects, tipping point
thresholds, and likely irreversible trajectories of transformation. Beyond 2C, the world
is likely to look nothing like the complexes of social-ecological systems we currently are
used to,122 including in the United States.
Of course, we cannot be certain about what the 4C world will look like and just
how different it will be. For a sense of that, however, we can turn to paleoclimate
records.123 For instance, drops in global average temperature of 4°C from pre-industrial
levels have led to ice ages.124 In the other direction, during much of the Paleocene and
early Eocene, when global average temperatures were roughly 7°C warmer than now,
“the poles were free of ice caps, and palm trees and crocodiles lived above the Arctic
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Circle.”125 In one of the most comprehensive analyses, Nolan et al. concluded that
without substantial mitigation efforts, all global terrestrial ecosystems are at risk of major
transformation in composition and structure.126
Stepping back, what does all this mean for humans? In somewhat clinical terms,
the IPCC has outlined the impacts of nonlinear change beyond 2°C. For example, the
IPCC calculates that both permafrost degradation and food supply instability enter the
realm of very high risk—“[v]ery high probability of severe impacts/risks and the
presence of significant irreversibility or the persistence of climate-related hazards,
combined with limited ability to adapt due to the nature of the hazard or impacts/risks”—
at 2°C. Dryland water scarcity and wildfire damage become very high risk at 3°C and
vegetation loss and tropical crop yield declines at about 3.5°C, but soil erosion does not
become very high risk until around 5°C.127 For wildfire damage, for example, our current
1°C increase in global average temperature means a longer fire season; at 2.5°C, 50%
more of the Mediterranean region is at risk of wildfire; and at about 4.3°C, 100 million
more people are at risk from wildfire.128 With respect to food security, the planet moves
from infrequent, locally important spikes in food prices at 1°C to “periodic food shocks
across regions” at 3.2°C to “sustained food supply disruptions globally” at about
4.3°C.129 The list goes on.
While alarming, these projections do not provide much sense of what life would
be like for humans under extreme conditions. For that, several authors have used
available scientific evidence to sketch out narratives in what might be termed scientific
speculation. For example, as early as 2008, Mark Lynas conjured progressive visions of
the world as global average temperatures increase from 1ºC to 6ºC.130 At 4ºC, places like
Bangladesh and New Jersey will rapidly be losing land mass and coastal cities around
the world—including Mumbai, Shanghai, London, Venice, New York, and New
Orleans—“may become fortified islands, largely below sea level and under siege from
all sides by the advancing waters.”131 At the same time, food security becomes an
international crisis as the world’s “breadbaskets” fail in rapid succession, often replaced
by deserts,132 while lands recently freed of ice and snow, like Canada and Russia, prove
unequal to the task of replacing them.133 Lynas concludes that “all of these regions will
be hemorrhaging people in the biggest human migration ever seen, with hundreds of
millions on the move in search of food and water”134 and “that mass starvation will be a
permanent danger for much of the human race in the four-degree world … .”135
Michon Scott & Rebecca Lindsey, What’s the Hottest Earth’s Ever Been?, NOAA
CLIMATE.GOV (June 18, 2020), https://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-qa/whats-hottest-earthsever-been.
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More recently, asking “Will your grandchildren live in cities on Antarctica?,” Frank
Jacobs more optimistically envisions a traumatic but ultimately successful human
migration to the poles.136 In contrast, for Gaia Vince of The Guardian, 4°C means
“[d]rowned cities; stagnant seas; intolerable heatwaves; entire nations uninhabitable …
and more than 11 billion humans. A four-degree-warmer world is the stuff of nightmares
and yet that’s where we’re heading in just decades.”137
While these visions differ in the details, they agree on several big points relevant
to adaptation governance. First, humans will be migrating en masse, probably mostly
toward the poles as middle latitudes become increasingly uninhabitable.138 Second, food
insecurity escalating to mass starvation will become a real problem for almost everyone
as both terrestrial and marine food systems fail.139 Third, sea level rise, melting ice and
increasing numbers of increasingly severe storms will transform the coasts, where
humanity has been concentrating itself, exacerbating migration pressures.140 Fourth, the
rest of the biosphere will be suffering disproportionately both from climate change itself
and from humanity’s attempts to adapt and survive—the sixth global mass extinction of
species will be well underway, exacerbated by increasing loss of habitat as a result both
of changing physical parameters and of new human settlement.141 Finally, while Homo
sapiens is unlikely to go extinct, human suffering is likely to increase dramatically. Under
any conditions, mass migration is generally accompanied by poor sanitation, poor
nutrition, nonexistent health care, and rampant disease; to that, climate change will add
heat stress and significantly reduced resources (e.g., food) and capacity for relief efforts.
Governments and governance systems need to be prepared, or we can certainly add war,
famine, disease, and increased inequalities into the narrative.
B. Acknowledging Potential Limitations on Humanity’s Adaptative Capacity
Having established the probability of planetary transformation, another potential
complication for adaptation governance is that humans might not be as adaptable to a
warmer world as they like to believe. Consider first that while the planet has repeatedly
supported a thriving biosphere at a global average temperature 5°C to 8°C hotter than
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today, humans, as a species, have never experienced those temperatures.142 Adapting to
a 4°C hotter world, therefore, is literally not in our DNA.
Nor, possibly, are humans as temperature-flexible as we might like to believe.
Developing the concept of the “human climate niche,” Xu et al. emphasize that, despite
all our advances in technology, even “today, humans, as well as the production of crops
and livestock . . . are concentrated in a strikingly narrow part of the total available climate
space.”143 They further conclude that temperature is that main determinant of where
people live144 and that humanity’s temperature preferences have not changed for at least
8000 years.145 These researchers suggest that “[t]his distribution likely reflects a human
temperature niche related to fundamental constraints.”146
If human thriving does depend on occupancy of this fundamental temperature
niche, the implications for climate change adaptation are profound. Warming now is
occurring ten to twenty times faster than when the planet was emerging from its ice
ages,147 giving both humans and ecosystems far less time to move to the temperature
zones that allow them to continue to survive.148
C. Imagining the United States When the World Is 4°C Warmer
What will a 4°C warmer United States look like? In the summer of 2020,
ProPublica and the New York Times partnered to address that very question.149 The project
vividly illustrated that the United States in a 4°C world looks quite different from the
United States at 2°C. Defining a “suitable zone” as the area of the nation in the sweet
spot of Xu et al.’s “human climate niche,”150 the zone covers most of the heart of the
nation today, moves northward under a moderate emissions scenario, converging around
the Great Lakes, and almost completely shifts into Canada under a high emissions
scenario.151 Putting these maps into descriptive words, Abraham Lustgarten of the New
Your Times observes that
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Urbanization also is a driver of rising population heat exposure, compounding the effects of
climate-induced heat exposure. See Ashley Mark Broadbent, Eric Scott Krayenhoff, &Matei Georgescu,
The Motley Drivers of Heat and Cold Exposure in 21 st Century US Cities, 117 PNAS 21108, 21108-10
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2005492117; Kangning Huang, Xia Li, Xiaoping Liu, & Karen C
Seto1Projecting Global Urban Land Expansion and Heat Island Intensification through 2050, 14 ENVT’L
RES. LETT. art. 114037, at 1-3 (2019)., https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab4b71.
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See Abrahm Lustgarten, How Climate Migration Will Reshape America, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/09/15/magazine/climate-crisis-migrationamerica.html; Al Shaw, Abrahm Lustgarten, & Jeremy W. Goldsmith, New Climate Maps Show a
Transformed United States, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/climatemigration/.
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Buffalo may feel in a few decades like Tempe, Ariz., does today, and Tempe itself
will sustain 100-degree average summer temperatures by the end of the century.
Extreme humidity from New Orleans to northern Wisconsin will make summers
increasingly unbearable, turning otherwise seemingly survivable heat waves into
debilitating health threats. Fresh water will also be in short supply, not only in the
West but also in places like Florida, Georgia and Alabama, where droughts now
regularly wither cotton fields.152

There are two important policy points to draw from this bleak scenario. First,
these changes will mean different things across the nation’s already varied climate. For
example, “large increases in heavy precipitation have [already] occurred in the Northeast,
Midwest, and Great Plains, where heavy downpours have frequently led to runoff that
exceeded the capacity of storm drains and levees, and caused flooding events and
accelerated erosion,” while Alaska is already experiencing melting permafrost that with
both destabilize infrastructure and accelerate climate change.153 Increased competition
for water—both among humans and between humans and ecosystems—is likely in the
Southeast, Caribbean, Great Plains, Hawaii, the Pacific Island Territories, and especially
the Southwest, which also faces increasing risks of catastrophic wildlife.154 The nation’s
coasts are increasingly at risk from sea-level rise and worsening storm surge, especially
in the Gulf of Mexico, and Southeast.155 Worsening—and life-threatening—heatwaves
are a risk everywhere.
Second, although the direct impacts of sea level rise, drought, heat, and other
threat factors may be uneven across the nation and across economic sectors, no region or
sector can be complacent that it will avoid disruption. Climate-induced impacts in one
region or sector undoubtedly will have knock-on effects elsewhere. For example,
increasingly unlivable temperatures in some regions, lack of potable water in other
regions, and the invasion of the sea in coastal regions are likely to drive significant
internal migrations within the United States’ borders, meaning every region of the nation
is affected.156 Regional and sectoral interactions from this and other impacts, such as crop
failures and water scarcity, will only be more intensive and far reaching in a 4°C world.157
Likewise, the United States will feel effects from around the globe as well, where in all
cases social-ecological system conditions worsen as temperatures rise.158
One need not fully accept all projections the ProPublica/New York Times project
produced to appreciate that the United States in a 4°C world would join the ranks of
152
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REPORT].
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Id. at 11.
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See Lustgarten supra note 149. Domestic internal migration is likely to be prevalent in many
nations. François Gemenne, Climate-induced Populations Displacements in a 4°C+ world, 369 PHIL.
TRANS. ROY. SOC. A 182, 182-83 (2011), doi:10.1098/rsta.2010.028.
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nations perceived today as most at risk in a 2°C world.159 At 4°C, the United States’
comparable wealth will not be enough to stop the “suitable zone” from exiting northward.
Welcome, United States, to a club no nation wishes to join.
As the ProPublica/New York Times project most emphasizes, the most significant
consequence of the high emissions scenario for the United States is internal domestic
human migration.160 At 2°C, we and other northern hemisphere developed nations are the
sought-after refuge for the hard-hit developing world. At 4°C, we may still be, but there
is likely to be significant migration within the United States, away from coastal regions,
away from intolerably hot regions, and away from regions with no sustainable potable
water supply. Ironically, as Lustgarten observes, “here in the United States, people have
largely gravitated toward environmental danger, building along coastlines from New
Jersey to Florida and settling across the cloudless deserts of the Southwest.”161 Under
extreme climate change, the gravitational pulls will be reversed.
What that means for different regions of the nation is likely to be a mixed bag. In
one influential study, geographer Mathew Hauer meticulously modeled the impacts of
sea level rise (SLR) on coastal communities and estimated demand for relocation to be as
high as 13 million people.162 His main point, however, is that they are moving somewhere
inland, meaning inland communities will have to adapt as well.163 Fan et al. find that this
inter-regional migration likely will also redistribute economic fortunes as a result of rising
wages and land prices in the in-migration regions.164 Other studies make predictions about
domestic migration responses to heat and natural disasters, often finding nonlinear
effects.165
The magnitude and impacts of domestic climate-induced inter-regional migration
have been largely ignored in adaptation planning in the United States (and elsewhere),
the spotlight being instead on cross-border international migration.166 New modalities of
adaptation governance will be necessary to cope with its impacts and the many other
transformations occurring in a 4°C world.167 We turn to that theme in the next Part.
III. ADAPTING TO 4°C: REORIENTING ADAPTATION POLICY FOR ANTICIPATORY
REDESIGN
Climate change adaptation policy took a back seat to mitigation policy until a
decade ago, when it became clear that severe and protracted harms would occur even if
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the (at that time) 1.5°C goal could be achieved.168 Indeed, in some policy circles speaking
of adaptation was forbidden, lest its potential for alleviating harm suppress support for
aggressive, costly mitigation policy.169 The inevitability of rising sea levels, hotter
climates, bigger storms, and other conditions eventually forced adaptation into the policy
discussion, and it is now seen as an essential partner of mitigation policy for both human
communities and conservation resources.170 Adaptation policy171 now focuses on key
drivers, including: (1) coastal flooding; (2) inland flooding; (3) weather event disruption
of electrical, emergency and other key infrastructure systems; (4) extreme heat; (5) food
insecurity; (6) water shortages; (7) marine ecosystem degradation; and (8) terrestrial and
inland water ecosystem disruption.172
Nevertheless, adaptation policy has largely centered around the 1.5°-2°C
scenario,173 although more recently cities in the United States have begun to include a
high emissions scenario in their adaptation plans.174 The 1.5°-2°C scenario is not pleasant
by any stretch, but it is not nearly as disruptive and difficult to manage as the 4°C scenario
described in Part II. In this Part we match up the current adaptation policy model against
the 4°C scenario. We conclude the current model is not up to the challenge, in large part
because progressively increasing temperatures geometrically, rather than arithmetically,
increase the disruptions to social-ecological systems from climate change. In particular,
domestic inter-regional migration in the United States will disrupt the population
landscape, with cascading consequent impacts. As a result, we propose that a new framing
is needed in order to prepare for adaptation beyond 2°C, a framing we call redesign.
A. Resistance, Resilience, and Retreat
Although there are different formulations and terminologies, current climate
change adaptation policy can be sorted into three modes: resistance (also known as
protect, fortify, or defend), resilience (also known as adjustment, accommodate, manage,
or transform), and retreat (also known as move, resettlement, relocation, or avoidance).175
168

For a history of the emergence and development of adaptation policy and research, see J.B.
Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVT’L L.
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These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and in many contexts may need to be
deployed simultaneously—e.g., even if Miami eventually needs to use retreat as part of
its strategy, its population needs to be protected and resilient during the time it takes to
move and then in their resettled part of the city.176 Nevertheless, the “Three Rs” are
distinct in terms of their core orientations to an adaptation response.
1. Resistance
Resistance polices focus on building infrastructure and other mostly technological
defenses to climate change impacts in order to protect human communities.177 Resistance
has long been a core policy approach to natural hazards in the United States. Classic
examples include seawalls along coastal areas and dams and levees along flood-prone
rivers.178 It is no surprise, therefore, that resistance strategies are prominent in many local
and regional climate change adaptation plans.179 Resistance strategies are less likely to be
effective for conservation lands, however, where climate change will directly alter
ecological resources and processes in ways that would be difficult if not impossible to
prevent.180
Resistance policies have been criticized from a number of perspectives, even in
the purely disaster-prevention context. One is that they encourage development in the
protected area, exposing more people and capital to risk if the infrastructure fails.181
Another is that they are expensive and thus most likely to be used to protect affluent and
politically powerful populations.182 Resistance strategies often take the form of “hard”
infrastructure, which almost inevitably come with significant environmental impacts,
from interruption of sand and sediment flows to blocked animal migration pathways to
altered habitat.183 This conventional approach conflicts with the growing advocacy for
natural or “green” approaches, such as enhancing coastal wetlands. 184 For 4°C climate
PRACTICE 125, 130 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2020.1704130 (using a variety of these
terms).
176
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SCI. 473, 473-75 (2014), DOI: 10.1126/science.1248222 (evaluating different mixes of strategies); Audrey
Baills, Manuel Garcin, & Thomas Bulteau, Assessment of Selected Climate Change Adaptation Measures
for Coastal Areas, 185 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 105059, at 3, 7 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.105059 (outlining a broad array of strategies and criteria for
evaluating selection).
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adaptation, all of these objections to resistance strategies remain, with the added
disincentive that the scale of necessary deployment presents staggering economic
costs.185 Resistance strategies, while likely necessary for many communities (at least in
the short term), thus must be carefully planned.
2. Resilience
Climate resilience policies are designed to facilitate a community’s capacity to
cope with climate change where impacts cannot be avoided or effectively resisted.186 For
example, there is no conceivable way a city could prevent ambient air temperatures from
rising or halt sea level rise, but it could subsidize air conditioning to make indoor
conditions more hospitable and adopt building and planning codes that integrate heatconscious and flood-conscious design. Resilience policy goes beyond technology and
response management, however, as social and economic system capacities also contribute
to a community’s overall resilience not only to climate change but also to other
disruptions.187 Such strategies can range from new forms of training to the conscious
diversification of industry and other forms of income.
Like resistance strategies, enhancing resilience capacity, particularly through
technology and response management strategies, has long been a focus of public policy
independent of climate change.188 Building architecture in earthquake-prone areas and
homes elevated on stilts in coastal areas offer technology examples, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency is a management example. Like resistance, therefore,
climate resilience strategies are a natural extension of past policy and have played a major
role thus far in climate adaptation policy.189 Moreover, some new forms of resilience
strategies are likely to be necessary for a 4°C future, from adaptive training in the health
care sector in response to emerging health threats 190 to crop diversification in

Seawalls—Adapting Shoreline Regulation to Address Sea Level Rise and Wetland Preservation in the Gulf
of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 327, 330-41 (2011).
185
For example, using a moderate emissions scenario, a recent study estimates that adequately
protecting coastal communities from sea level rise would cost over $400 billion over the next 20 years.
CENTER FOR CLIMATE INTEGRITY, HIGH TIDE TAX: THE PRICE TO PROTECT COASTAL STATES FROM RISING
SEAS 1 (June 2019), available at https://www.climatecosts2040.org/files/ClimateCosts2040_Reportv4.pdf.
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agriculture.191 Resilience strategies also can play a role for conservation lands, where
managers, recognizing that many changes will be unavoidable, turn their attention to
maintaining overall resilience in dynamically transforming ecosystems. 192 Nevertheless,
resilience strategies are also subject to many of the same criticisms as resistance.193
3. Retreat
Retreat policies focus on intentionally abandoning areas subject to harms and
relocating the people and structures to less vulnerable locations.194 In the context of
climate change adaptation, retreat comes into play when it is anticipated that resist and
resilience policies will not be technologically or economically practicable or sufficiently
effective for reducing or avoiding harms.195 For example, sea walls may protect a coastal
community against storm surge, but they will not prevent saltwater intrusion to
groundwater as sea level rises, and it may be cost prohibitive to replace the impaired
drinking water source with other sources.196 Inland, areas on the wildland-urban interface
may experience more frequent and intense wildfires that cannot be adequately prevented
and controlled.197 At some point resistance and resilience strategies may simply fail to
manage risk to acceptable levels at acceptable cost, leaving retreat as the only viable
option.198
In climate adaptation policy, retreat is usually described as locally “managed,” in
that there is a deliberate policy regime and administrator designed to carry out an orderly
process for moving the built environment and sub-communities out of harm’s way,
191
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ideally well before the harms become significant.199 Although voluntary post-disaster
retreat programs have been implemented in various locations in the United States,200 this
form of “preemptive” retreat—retreat forced and managed in anticipation of conditions
exceeding the capacity of resistance and resilience strategies—has not yet been
implemented anywhere in the United States and surely would face stiff pushback from
many interests, not just the people being relocated.201 There is a long history of forced
relocations in the United States and elsewhere, and they have almost always been
controversial.202 Even when relocation is the only alternative and relocations are provided
within the same general area, it disrupts community and culture. 203 Nevertheless, retreat
is increasingly being included in policy discussions as either a potentially necessary or
more cost-effective adaptation strategy for human communities, particularly among
Pacific Island nations already at existential risk from climate change and sea level rise.204
Retreat is more difficult to implement for conservation lands, which have fixed
boundaries. Proposals for migratory conservation spaces do exist,205 and assisted
migration—the translocation of species from degrading habitats to existing or emerging
suitable habitats—can be thought of as a form of retreat.206 However, it is important to
remember throughout this discussion of human adaptation responses that ecosystems are
already both changing compositionally and shifting geographically—i.e., transforming
and retreating. As such, ecological change all by itself is increasingly likely to perturb
long-established social-ecological relationships, whether those be ranching communities
in Montana, sportfishing-dependent communities in Florida, or salmon-focused Tribes in
the Pacific Northwest.
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B. The Three Rs Versus 4°C

Current adaptation policy proposes deploying the Three Rs to manage the key
drivers of adaptation need.207 The emphasis in the United States (and elsewhere) has been
on using incremental adaptation to keep human communities mostly intact, in situ, and
close to normal.208 Of course, it makes sense that a city’s or region’s adaptation plan
would focus on managing adaptation needs of the city or region. But even our national
adaptation strategy, when there has been one, has been focused primarily on how to
support those local and regional strategies, and adaptation is almost always presented as
an adjunct to mitigation.209 President Biden had the United States rejoin the Paris Climate
Accord on his first day in office and issued his Climate Change Executive Order on the
eighth.210 While these are excellent signals of the Administration’s prioritization of
climate change, the focus remains primarily on mitigation, with adaptation provisions
focusing on building in situ resilience.211
This focus on incremental, in situ adaptation carried out largely at state and local
scales has led to a heavy emphasis on resistance and resilience strategies,212 even to the
point of envisioning “future proofing” or “climate proofing” cities and regions.213
Managed retreat has been added as a last resort in most instances and is portrayed as part
of a local strategy that retains the relocated population and businesses within the general
locale.214 To be sure, it is generally recognized that adaptation will transform how many
communities look and operate, but the overwhelming policy goal in most adaptation plans
is to stay put.215 For conservation resources, moving is generally not an option, so staying
put means dealing with transformation through resist strategies (e.g., removing invasive
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species216) and resilience strategies (e.g., managing fire fuel sources217), although there
has been increasing attention to assisted transformation strategies instead—that is, on
guiding the conservation lands into different but still productive ecosystem states.218
The emphasis on adapting in place is not surprising, as it would be politically
unwise for a local government to declare that its adaptation policy is to dismantle the city
and promote out-migration, while conservation resource managers face the reality that
moving the protected land boundaries is generally not an option. Nevertheless, climate
adaptation policy has generally not peered into the world beyond 2°C. That “high
emissions” scenario is described in many adaptation reports and studies, but usually as
something to be avoided, not as a world that might actually need to be planned for and
governed.219 We are aware of no national, state, or local adaptation plan that both builds
out a 4°C scenario and asks: What if staying put for substantial segments of our
population is not viable?220 Nor, it appears, are cities that will be able to stay put asking
what happens when they must adapt to substantial in-migration from the other cities.221
It may very well turn out that many communities and sectors are able to “future proof”
against a 2°C world and that conservation managers are able to keep ecological resources
functioning, albeit in new forms, at 2°C—particularly in relatively wealthy northern
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hemisphere nations like the United States.222 It is tempting to believe, therefore, that if
the planet warms beyond 2°C the Three Rs will nevertheless continue to support
incremental, in situ adaptation and keep existing human communities and conservation
resources functioning.
If you buy into that, read Part II carefully again. How do we “future proof” against
the 4C scenario?
The problem is that, as described in Part II, the 2°C mark, as nasty as it is, is likely
the threshold at which, if crossed, climate change takes on new and highly unmanageable
properties. The Three Rs as currently modeled and integrated into “future proofing”
polices do not consider runaway interacting positive feedback loops, cascade effects in
the climate system, and the impacts they will have on social-ecological systems. As a
result, there is growing concern that climate change beyond 2°C will swamp the
capacities of the Three Rs and that transformational adaptation policies will need to
operate at much larger scales, introduce novel strategies, and contemplate major changes
and relocations.223
While it is true that individual humans in small groups can survive a wide range
of climatological conditions, humans in larger groups—cities and counties—face real
limits on their adaptability. Consider a coastal city in Florida: It may be facing relentless
storm surges and hurricanes, a drinking water aquifer contaminated with saltwater, the
return of diseases like malaria and dengue fever, and frequent dangerous heat waves.
Resistance and resilience strategies would have to be herculean to manage risks of that
level (and even at that might fail), and locally-managed retreat is pointless—there is no
place locally that is out of harm’s way.
In short, adaptation in essence is a form of risk management. A world at 4°C
presents not only radically more intense versions of the risks of a 2°C world, but also
different kinds of risks. It follows that a new kind of risk management mode—one that is
both anticipatory and transformative—will be needed.
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Given our focus on governance in the United States. we have largely set to one side for this
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C. Reframing Adaptation for Redesign
The Three Rs will always be necessary, but they are not aimed at managing the
fundamental redesign of biophysical systems that 4°C will impose. For that kind of risk,
an anticipatory adaptation policy must move from incremental to transformative and be
prepared in advance to redesign social systems. To put it another way, if the ecological
system components of a complex social-ecological system are undergoing deep and
unpreventable redesign, so must the social system components and so must the way we
approach management of the ecological resources. No amount of locally-governed
resistance, resilience, or managed retreat can avoid that fundamental property of the
coevolving social and ecological components of large-scale systems in a 4°C world.
So, what does redesign mean? First and foremost, it means letting go of intact, in
situ, and close-to-normal as the unyielding goal of adaptation. As discussed in Part II.C,
even within the United States we can expect massive human migrations and massive
species migrations.224 We can expect relocation of agricultural crop and livestock
lands.225 We can expect extensive, expensive infrastructure projects to supply housing,
water, transportation, and other needs for new and expanding human communities.226 We
can expect deep disruptions to insurance, finance, welfare, and other social and economic
systems.227 Redesign is about designing and facilitating—perhaps even requiring—the
relocations and reconfigurations necessary for these adaptations to succeed.
Most importantly, however, we can expect the scale of adaptation to shift its
primary locus from local and state to regional and national.228 It is plausible, when
planning for a 2°C world, for a city or state to look inward, asking how it can promote its
continued functionalities, including growth and development, through the Three Rs. A
4°C world vastly complicates that inward-looking approach by introducing the prospect
of substantial inter-regional population migration and all that comes along, or leaves, with
it. Similarly, rural areas may face the complete loss, or widespread introduction, of
agricultural land uses, and conservation resource managers may find a complete
abandonment by, or substantial increase in, recreational users. In short, local adaptation
planning, whether for urban or rural communities or conservation resource managers, will
need also to look outward to plan coherently for the inward perspective.
This outward-looking dimension of adaptation planning necessarily raises the
question of how to plan for the between. The fate of any city or region will, more than
ever before, depend on what is happening in other cities and regions, as people,
agriculture, infrastructure, water, energy, and other social-ecological system components
shift around the nation, in many cases over relatively short time frames. The between-
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looking dimension captures the interconnectedness of climate change adaptation at
national scale and its influence on local, state, and regional planning.229
Of course, there already is a network that connects cities and regions with each
other—the highways and other transportation infrastructure, pipelines and transmission
lines, product supply chains, banking and finance systems, and other systems that operate
at national scale to support local and regional scales. However, if some regions of the
nation are literally shutting down and the people leaving, destined either for other cities
or for newly developing areas, and yet more people are pressing to enter the nation, the
existing interconnection networks will not in the right configurations or scaled to the right
local capacities. They will need to be redesigned, as well as technologically improved
and innovated, to deal with 4°C conditions. We are going to need to build new and better
between infrastructure and capacity, and we will need it to enable massive movement of
humans, other species, and what comes along with that.
To be sure, shocks of this magnitude have befallen cities in the past, and there
have been pulses of substantial human migration in our nation, such as in response to the
Dust Bowl.230 There is one important distinction, however, between those experiences
and the redesign mode of climate change adaptation—we know climate change is coming,
that it may drag us near or up to a 4°C world, and that if it does, the kind and scale of
disruptions we have outlined in Part II will be inevitable and long-lasting. Redesign will
not be optional, nor should it be a surprise that it is necessary. Importantly, however, we
also have the ability to plan ahead, a luxury that should not be squandered.
This brings us to the question to which the remainder of this Article is devoted:
What to do about it? More to the point, why do anything about it now? After all, it is not
as if a 4°C world is just around the corner. If we cross the 2°C threshold as a global
average, it will likely be several decades from now at the soonest.231 Why not just wait
and see, letting people decide with their feet and depending on nimble markets and astute
policy-makers to take care of the redesign then? And what can be done about it all now,
anyway, even if we wanted to? It would be impractical to start building the redesign
infrastructure before people need it.
These are legitimate questions. Perhaps this Article should end here, acting as
testimony to future generations that we knew what was coming but decided it best to
leave it to them to figure out what to do about it.
The two of us choose instead to forge ahead. Specifically, we proceed from here
to argue that future generations deserve better than that, and that the present generation
can in fact deliver better.
IV. GOVERNING AT 4°C: CONCEPTUALIZING, PLANNING, AND IMPLEMENTING
REDESIGN ADAPTATION
As Part II laid out in detail, Planet Earth is well on its way to being 4ºC; indeed,
despite the global pandemic, 2020 tied for the hottest year on record (with 2016), with
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global average temperatures reaching 1.25ºC higher than in preindustrial times.232
Australian researchers have already concluded, “there is widespread agreement that
current mitigation efforts … will lead to global average warming of 4ºC or more from
pre-industrial levels by the end of this century … to a Four Degree World.”233 The two
of us are not willing to risk the future of democratic governance to unwarranted optimism
that the global community will successfully solve the climate change mitigation problem
in time to keep the global average increase in temperature below 2ºC. The issue then
becomes: What can the United States do now to facilitate the survival of democratic
governance in a 4ºC world?
The United States (like the rest of the world’s governments) will increasingly be
dealing with transformational change. This governance challenge will likely last until
sometime long after atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases finally stabilize.234
As such, U.S. governance needs to move into—or at least be prepared to move into—the
redesign mode of climate change adaptation.
Clearly, we shouldn’t be seeking to iron out all the nitty-gritty details of a
redesigned United States right now. Even setting issues of individual liberty to one side
for the moment (something we prefer future governance not to do in reality), climate
change impacts remain too probabilistic and too long-term for excessively detailed plans.
Nevertheless, probabilities are informative. As the discussions above emphasize,
the most important consequence of transformational 4ºC warming for conceptualizing the
governance of redesign adaptation is massive human migration within the United States.
This focus includes both the attendant needs of that migration (e.g., infrastructure, social
reorganization, economic stabilization, food and water security, health care adjustments)
and its attendant impacts (e.g., competition with species and ecosystems that are also
moving and transforming, competition with agricultural land, abandoned infrastructure
and toxic contamination, energy consumption, social and economic disruption).
Moreover, while the exact details of future migration patterns cannot yet be pinpointed
with any precision, there is general consensus that the coasts and the southern parts of the
United States are most at risk of becoming unlivable and hence that the country’s more
northern and interior areas are likely migration destinations. Finally, even acknowledging
that surprises like pandemics will occur, climate change experts in the United States
already have a working grasp of key systemic vulnerabilities that will warrant governance
attention—water supply, food security, energy reliability, economic perturbations,
environmental degradation and transformation, and inequitable distribution of and access
to all of the above.
Thus, in conceptualizing a redesign mode of adaptation in the United States, we
already understand, at least in broad strokes, what goals law and governance need to
facilitate—a significant shift of human populations and their housing and other support
232
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systems northward and inward, while simultaneously preserving (or opening up) lands
for agriculture, species habitat, and migration corridors. Preservation of a functional
democracy at the same time imposes two requirements on how the U.S governs toward
this goal. First, governance of these changes must be legitimate, so that citizens accept
and comply with the changes and their accompanying social and economic dislocations.
Second, governance of these changes must be equitable, ensuring the health, safety, and,
ideally, prospering of the United States’ most vulnerable communities rather than simply
exacerbating existing inequalities.235
That leaves two last questions: First, How should the United States finance this
massive scale of social and economic transformation?; and, second: Who’s in charge?
Given the scale, both financial and geographic, of redesign adaptation, we posit that the
answer to both questions will lie primarily in the federal government—although, as is
always true in adaptation governance, governance at all levels will remain necessary, at
least through the first few decades. Adapting to 4ºC is beyond the capacity of any single
state or local government. Human migration within the United States, and the
accompanying reconfigurations of the nation’s economic, political, social, energy, food,
and transportation systems will require a national perspective, national coordination, and
a national budget.236 For these and other reasons, the two of us find the governance
challenges and solutions that emerged through the complex of the Great Depression, Dust
Bowl, and World War II ramp-up highly instructive historical precedents for redesign
adaptation, as discussed in more detail below.
Which takes us to our second point about governance for 4ºC. Just as probabilistic
scenarios are helpful even though they cannot precisely inform us of the future, so, too,
do past governance challenges and experiments in the United States—successful or
otherwise—provide helpful tools that can increase the odds of the United States’ redesign
adaptation succeeding, in all the senses of “success” identified above. In part because of
its size, in part because of its federalist structure, and in part because of its general
willingness to embrace “progress” and technological innovation despite their unintended
consequences, the United States has a governance toolbox that is both wide and deep,
developed from an ongoing willingness to experiment with governance institutions and
235
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mechanisms while both preserving and evolving core societal values. One contemporary
non-climate change example is how to preserve and effectuate Fourth Amendment
privacy in a world of “smart” personal electronic devices that are more than capable of
spying on, and ratting out, their owners.237 Administrative law is a largely 20th-century
invention that (mostly successfully) allows a federal administrative state to be shoehorned
into a Constitution that never imagined a need for daily regulatory interactions between
the federal government and the inhabitants of the United States, and this new subset of
law eventually provided those residents with multiple ways to keep tabs on their
government.238 It is neither a distortion nor an insult to view the history of U.S. law and
governance as 250 years of making it up as we go.
In short, the United States is not stepping into a 4ºC governance future blind and
unarmed. Nor are its governance systems so welded to set traditions and unchanging
requirements that adaptation governance in a redesign mode requires fundamental
revolution. These are bedrock governance advantages that the United States can capitalize
upon.
None of which is to say, however, that transitioning to governance for a 4ºC nation
will be easy. The remainder of this part explores what the two of us consider the four
most critical starting points. Our public and private governance institutions and polity
must recognize: (1) that transformative change will occur in diverse modalities
simultaneously, complicating the governance of redesign adaptation; (2) that the various
governance tools available require careful deployment toward coordinated goals; (3) that
such deployment will require a coherent, anticipatory model for designing policy
strategies around the intersections of change modes with governance modes; and (4) that
there is a need now to actively plan for redesign adaptation and its governance, including
identifying and then carrying out the multidisciplinary research still needed to guide the
planning effort as it unfurls.
A. Different Modes of Change: A Planning Typology for Redesign
Part II presented a blizzard of predictions about what can be expected in a 4ºC
world. At a macro scale—albeit a grossly simplified one—the change forces driving those
specific conditions can be sorted into three modes: baseline linear, nonlinear, and
cascades. These modes of change reflect not only the direct effects of climate change
(hotter days) but also the effects of adaptation to them (building sea walls). We use human
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migration to illustrate the three different change modes. Migration, after all, is a form of
adaptation,239 and environmental change has long been a driver of human migration.240
In his perceptive assessment of climate change-driven human migration,
geographer Robert McLeman outlines a progression of thresholds:
Six types of thresholds in response to climate hazards are identified: (1) Adaptation
becomes necessary; (2) Adaptation becomes ineffective; (3) Substantive changes
in land use/livelihoods become necessary; (4) In situ adaptation fails, migration
ensues; (5) Migration rates become non-linear; and (6) Migration rates cease to be
non-linear.241

Migration in stages 1-3 of his model might look little different from current baseline
population movement patterns in the United States, perhaps with origins and destinations
shifted. Of particular concern to us is McLeman’s stage 4, when in situ adaptation fails,
and what migration looks like after that. His description of “nonlinear rates” in stage 5
captures the other two of our change modes—nonlinear and cascades. This section
examines each of these three change modes.
1.

Baseline Linear Change

Many of the direct effects of climate change, such as sea level rise, warming, and
the shifting of species ranges, will transpire in incremental, linear trends over relatively
long timeframes. Against this slow-moving background, some measure of human
migration will also take place at a baseline historical level. People have always moved
around in the United States—baseline migration is nothing new. Nevertheless, over long
time frames, baseline population migration and other incremental, linear changes can
produce significant macro-level change; for example, the ranking of US cities by
population since the 1700s exhibits a massive reshuffling.242 Long-term effects of
baseline linear migration, such as movement from rural to urban areas, thus eventually
can present policy challenges from accumulating effects, such as increased competition
for employment and housing.243 In the short term, however, the changes may seem
imperceptible and not warranting any particular policy concern. As people and employers
begin to factor climate change into their location decisions, it is entirely possible that
climate change has already become a factor influencing this kind of domestic U.S.
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baseline migration pattern, but in ways that have not yet surfaced at the macro-scale into
policy concerns.244
2.

Nonlinear Change

Climate change already is having effects that depart from baseline linear change
and which over time will shift the entire envelope of variability for phenomena such as
storm intensity.245 Similarly, population migration in the U.S. has never been purely a
baseline linear phenomenon; instead, episodes of amplified, purposeful migration
occurred throughout the nation’s history. The settlement of the American West through
the 1800s, for example, was a long process with many complex causes and effects, laying
the foundation for later national-scale baseline migration.246 In the 1900s, the migration
of blacks from the South to the North, Midwest, and West shifted over six million people
between 1915 and 1970.247 In contrast to baseline moves for a new job or to retire to a
warmer climate, broad social and economic forces induced these building waves of
migration, creating uneven effects across the national landscape. These migrations also
raised policy issues; as one example, the West adopted prior appropriation for its water
law, participated in massive irrigation projects with the new U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
and through the many reclamation laws Congress enacted, and continues to move massive
amounts of water to service farms and cities.248
Sea level rise is expected to produce this kind of nonlinear migration wave, as a
large swath of the population—coastal residents and employers—faces a common
motivation for moving.249 The impacts of sea level rise migration also will likely be
uneven, with some models suggesting that most relocations will be to nearby inland
counties, but also into the interior of the nation.250 As these pulses of migration build,
policy issues are sure to arise as out-migration threatens economic and social prosperity
in some areas and influxes of population stress housing supply and infrastructure capacity
in other areas.251
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Cascades Change

As explained in Part II, rising temperatures will cause ecological systems to cross
tipping points and experience systemic cascades of rapid change. So, too, with social
systems. Such tipping point “sudden onset” events have triggered migration cascades in
the past, classic cases being the Dust Bowl migration of the 1930s and the post-Katrina
relocation out of the New Orleans area.252 Both of these migratory cascades occurred over
short time frames and had national policy consequences. The Dust Bowl, for example,
was triggered when farmers in the Great Plains “pushed beyond the ‘unstable
equilibrium’ of cropland-to-grassland” and led afterwards to “a greatly expanded
participation of government in land management and soil conservation.”253 It would be
naïve to fail to anticipate similar sudden onset migration cascades on the way to a 4ºC
future.
B. The Toolbox: An Implementation Typology for Redesign
Having simplified adaptation into three modes of change, we continue with our
gross simplification of anticipatory adaptation in this section by reducing adaptation
governance to three top-level modes: laissez faire, planning and prompting, and
preemption and mandates. We suggest how specific examples of each mode could guide
policy design in the 4ºC adaptation context.
1.

Laissez Faire

Faith in the invisible hand of the market is never far from the surface of American
politics and policies, and, especially in the early stages, the normal forces of supply and
demand may in fact work surprisingly well to push and pull adaptation to a 4ºC United
States in the right directions. For example, water-rich areas in cooler climates may start
tempting water-dependent industries, like many of those in Silicon Valley, to move,
facilitating migration away from water-constrained locations.254 Such municipal and state
business plans might simultaneously encourage voluntary migrants to re-occupy cities
that have significantly declined in population, such as Detroit, potentially reducing the
eventual infrastructure costs of redesign adaptation. Evidence that water may become a
driving force of new markets as well as relocation comes from California, where a water
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futures market to reduce local risks of drought began trading in December 2020,255 and
from increasing investor interest in marketing Colorado River water.256
Existing markets will also respond to climate change, sending signals that larger
change is near. For example, John Nolon assembled several case studies of real estate
markets across the United States where “land use climate bubbles” have burst or are at
significant risk of bursting—that is, places “where land and building values are declining
due to consequences associated with climate change.”257 The climate risks inherent in real
estate markets are also an equity issue; for example, it is lower-income families that tend
to end up owning properties at significant risk of flooding.258
One important player in climate-affected markets is likely to be the private
insurance industry. Insurance companies already have considerable expertise at factoring
climate change risk into their premiums, and they have already sued governments that
have made their losses worse by failing to build climate change resilience into local
infrastructure.259 Perhaps the more important adaptation role for private insurance
companies, however, is as market signalers of when in situ adaptation is becoming too
expensive to be profitable, as has occurred both in response to increasing wildfire damage
in California260 and hurricane damage along the Gulf. After the disastrous hurricane
season of 2004-2005, companies providing homeowners insurance left the Florida market
in droves.261 Insurance companies are similarly poised to stop issuing wildfire insurance
in California, discontinuing hundreds of thousands of policies in 2019 and 2020.262
Clearer pre-collapse warnings that in situ adaptation may be becoming impossible in
these locations are difficult to conceive.
Private insurance market signals will be most effective, however, if federal and
state governments do not intervene. Evidence to date, however, indicates that politics will
produce exactly the opposite result. Private insurance companies long ago gave up on
255
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insuring areas of high flood risk, which is why the federal government stepped in with
the National Flood Insurance Program, which is now significantly in debt.263 Similarly,
instead of listening to the market, the State of Florida stepped in to fill the 2005 insurance
void, and homeowners’ insurance in Florida remains a “disaster” 15 years later.264 Most
recently, the California Legislature instituted a one-year freeze in November 2020,
prohibiting insurance companies from discontinuing wildfire policies.265
Thus, insurance markets also reveal the public’s and politicians’ limited appetites
for truly laissez-faire economics when migration has become a financially rational
adaptation response. Acknowledging that political reality, state and federal governments
can begin to act now to legally change their responses to bursting real estate climate
bubbles and insurance company withdrawals. Given public demands for government
action when the market signals become focused enough, governments should direct those
emerging social licenses to act toward the ends of equitable redesign adaptation. For
example, if governments want to help owners of properties at risk from climate change,
they should do so on the understanding that the “insurance” payout is really the
government’s purchase of the at-risk property (probably at a higher-than-market rate) that
enables the former property owner to move somewhere safer rather than to rebuild in
place.266 Such creative approaches to disaster insurance would both facilitate migration
as it becomes necessary and ensure that the nation’s most vulnerable citizens aren’t left
holding title to worthless real estate with no means to move.
2.

Planning and Prodding

Few policy realms in the United States are left solely or even largely to markets.
A soft mode of government intervention involves planning to guide public policy and
prodding to guide private actors into stepping in line with those policies. Planning and
prodding will play important roles in shaping anticipatory adaptation for a 4ºC nation.
a.

Planning

If the discussions in Parts III and IV suggest anything, it is that redesign adaptation
for a 4ºC United States will require massive exercises in planning. First, redesign
adaptation requires a spatial rearrangement of both people and land uses on a national
scale. Decisions regarding where people can live and where various kinds of human uses
of space can occur has long been considered both a proper governmental function, from
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land use planning and zoning on land267 to marine spatial planning in the ocean.268 Marine
spatial planning provides an improved model for redesign adaptation over land use
planning because it also takes into account the needs of the natural environment and
ecosystems269—needs that should be very much part of redesign adaptation.
Second, redesign adaptation will require infrastructure upgrades, construction,
and dismantling, with sequencing considerations and impacts—both environmental and
societal—that warrant significant planning. Notably, there is considerable agreement that
the United States’ basic infrastructure already warrants increased investment. For
example, the American Society of Civil Engineers last Report Card on America’s
Infrastructure, in 2017, gave the nation’s infrastructure an overall grade of D+.270 In 2016,
then Candidate Trump promised $1 trillion toward infrastructure development, giving
some indication of the needed investment just to deal with current infrastructure issues.271
President Biden’s January 2021 Climate Change Executive Order also includes a
substantial commitment to infrastructure development.272 The bipartisan appeal of
infrastructure investment and its bridging of white collar and blue collar, local and
national, urban and rural, and economic and security interests make infrastructure a
leading candidate both to heal social and political rifts and to kickstart adaptation to a 4ºC
United States.
Third, redesign adaptation will require increased and directed research in the
“hard,” “applied,” and social sciences and in engineering to better project climate change
impacts across the United States, human responses to those impacts, and ecosystem
responses and needs; to identify important tipping points and thresholds; and to both
identify and develop tools for the multiple transitions—everything from drought-resistant
crops and revised agricultural business strategies (e.g., a transition away from
monocropping) to climate-adjusted healthcare training and treatments to various forms of
prediction software to colocation strategies for species to psychological support systems
to equity-enhancing policies. These research programs warrant planning to avoid ad hoc
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studies, to coordinate research across disciplines, and to improve information
dissemination.
Finally, as current infrastructure needs amply demonstrate, redesign adaptation
requires significant amounts of money—including money for the planning process itself.
Thus, financial planning must also be part of the adaptation toolbox.
b.

Prodding

Government can also prod private institutions into planning and action. As noted,
left to its own devices, the insurance industry is likely to provide fairly strong signals of
when the time has come for humans to abandon certain areas of the country. Governments
could then reinforce these market signals with additional inducements. The conversion of
government insurance subsidies to buyout programs already discussed is one such
strategy, combining the incentive of government support with an eventual mandate to
leave.
The closely related government provision of disaster relief is another area of aid
that governments could adjust to better serve the 4ºC adaptation enterprise. In terms of
politics, governments are unlikely to resist calls for disaster relief when the next
hurricane, flood, or wildfire wipes out a community of uninsured residents and
businesses. Nor, given our goal of using redesign adaptation as a means of increasing
social equity, do the two of us advocate that governments simply ignore these disasters.
Rather, disaster relief, like all redesign adaptation, needs to shift its focus away from in
situ remedies—food, water, shelter, rebuilding—to redesign goals operating at a higher
scale. Thus, disaster relief should increasingly take the form of relocating destroyed
communities and should include retraining and education so that victims can thrive in the
evolving 4ºC economy. This reformulated relief could simultaneously promote social
equity by providing more benefits to migrants who were already disadvantaged.
Fortunately, acceptance of differential access to government relief is deeply embedded in
U.S. law and society; the trick will be to prevent the attachment of stigma (e.g., “welfare
moms”) to qualification for and/or acceptance of this relief. In this respect, the
coronavirus pandemic may provide a helpful example. Whatever legitimate criticisms
might be leveled at Congress’s provision of coronavirus relief in 2020, that relief when it
arrived both included differential access and remained relatively untainted by social
stigma. Governance for 4ºC redesign adaptation thus might strive to figure climate change
as a common enemy that nevertheless hurts some people more than others through no real
fault of theirs.
Of course, other climate-relevant government subsidies and payment programs
already exist.273 These programs can change individual and business behavior274—
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although, admittedly, many operate as perverse incentives.275 Crop subsidies are one
obvious example existing subsidies that government could retool to far better incentivize
redesign adaptation. These subsidies already create perverse incentives;276 the worsening
of water pollution as a result of incentivizing crops for ethanol fuels is particularly well
studied.277 In redesign adaptation, agricultural subsidies could serve much more useful—
if completely different—goals than they currently do, such as reducing the economic risks
to farmers agreeing to farm new lands as agriculture shifts geographically, to experiment
with new crops and seed stocks that are better suited to the changing climate, to diversify
their crops to reduce the risks of catastrophic failure of monocrops, and to experiment
with new forms of integrated pest management (to reduce pesticide use) and crop
combinations (to take advantage of functional interactivity). Future Farm Bills might also
incentivize farmers to invest in water conservation technologies for irrigated agriculture
in the “right” locations while simultaneously engaging in best management practices to
improve water quality, or simply fund that technological and management evolution
outright.
Tax incentives, similarly, can help incentivize voluntary contributions to redesign
adaptation. Conservation easements provide one model of land use incentive with an
important tax component—although, as several scholars have pointed out, the model
could be improved to allow for gradual evolution and better monitoring.278 Nevertheless,
conservation easements might be rethought to incentivize the creation of migration
corridors for other species or the translocation of species that need human assistance to
find new habitats. Municipalities have long used tax breaks and other financial incentives
to induce businesses to choose to move there,279 and state and federal governments could
conceivably add their own tax inducements to encourage businesses and their ancillary
support systems to begin the migration to redesign-desirable new locations. For example,
at the beginning of 2020, the state of Vermont implemented a New Worker Incentive
Program to encourage young families to move to Vermont and work for Vermont
employers, building on a Remote Worker Grant Program that pre-dated the pandemic and
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encouraged people to live in Vermont while working for an employer elsewhere.280 The
individual efforts of Vermont and other destination states could result in competition for
migrants—a competition that could become exceedingly helpful to redesign adaptation
with a bit of coordination and considerable funding from the federal government. This
incentive structure, too, already exists in federal law, most notably in the multiple
environmental law grant programs and Revolving State Loan funds that helped the nation
initially invest in sewage treatment infrastructure,281 improve its municipal drinking water
treatment capacity,282 and clean up open dumps,283 among other noteworthy goals.284
A final incentive that might well be worth reviving is land giveaways, perhaps
reconceived in conjunction with insurance buyouts as land swaps. Throughout the United
States’ history, the federal government has gifted land to various groups of people in
pursuit of national goals, such as the (largely failed) goal of providing newly freed slaves
with the means to support themselves285 and the far more successful goal of settling the
West through Homestead Acts.286 The two of us are not in any way suggesting that all
federal public lands be converted to private ownership.287 Nevertheless, some of these
lands currently serve specific purposes that might become impossible as climate change
worsens, even as other public lands are becoming critical havens and corridors for shifting
species and ecosystems. Humans are far less fussy about their habitats than many
protected species, and evolving ecosystems in National Forests or National Grasslands
may lose their current non-human inhabitants and not, for whatever reason, acquire
others.
280
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Suggesting that the federal government might consider gifting any of the
remaining public lands is virtually certain to raise objections. If outright gifts of public
lands remain politically infeasible in the early stages of redesign adaptation, land swaps
may be a more palatable approach. For example, we have suggested that governments
acquire coastal properties, and these are likely to retain considerable recreational, coastal
habitat and fisheries, aquaculture, transportation, and/or national security value even as
they lose their capacities to support human settlement. Instead of purchasing these
properties for cash, governments might exchange some of their inland property instead,
or purchase land in and around cities abandoned for other reasons (e.g., Detroit) if they
turn out to be excellent locations for future human settlement. Regardless of the exact
incentive structure, however, government-owned land can once again become a tool to
effectuate policy, this time incentivizing settlement into safer areas of the country and
new agricultural production areas while (through swaps, at least) simultaneously shifting
other kinds of public uses to depopulated regions. Even the expanding deserts of the
American Southwest may retain public value as the sites of solar or algae energy farms.
The larger point is that, as part of redesign adaptation, Americans need to be willing to
reconceive the nation’s land use patterns, including in terms of public lands.
3.

Preemption and Mandates

The United States is no stranger to more forceful modes of public governance
intervention, including mandates and top-down preemption from federal and state
authorities. Although almost always controversial, it is difficult to imagine how
adaptation policy for a 4ºC nation could succeed without ample use of strong forms of
public governance intervention. We outline several examples below.
a.

Cooperative Federalism

If uncoordinated federal and state action is one potential redesign problem—as it
has been for the nation’s COVID-19 response—the cooperative federalism embedded in
multiple environmental and natural resources statutes provides one tested mechanism for
coordinating those governments toward a common goal. Within these statutes, Congress
generally uses its constitutional authority (often the Commerce Clause) to force all 50
states into baseline protections of environmental quality and human health, but leaves
each state free to enact more stringent protections.288
Cooperative federalism for redesign adaptation might require a little heavier hand
on Congress’s part, essentially requiring that every state participate in redesign adaptation
planning and management. For example, with regard to outmigration states, Congress
might create (or delegate authority to create) a “climate livability index” that incorporates
objective standards for assessing when migration out of certain areas is, progressively,
rational, warranted, recommended, or required. The federal government could then phase
out key federal support mechanisms and/or phase in federal migration programs (like land
swap offers or insurance buyout structures) at each stage, while leaving each state free to
288
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create its own interim adaptation plans and programs. At the same time, Congress could
create grants, technology transfers, and planning incentives to assist in-migration states
in planning and building for anticipated arrivals of migrants, while still leaving each state
considerable freedom to plan its own settlement patterns.
b.

Public Works Programs

If the federal government is going to end up paying for a lot of the redesign
adaptation infrastructure anyway, it might consider doing so through a public works
program that both creates paying jobs and provides “future-proof” training to employees.
The most obvious model for this massive federal public works program is President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “alphabet soup” of programs during the Great
Depression,289 albeit with significantly more focused final aims. Notably, President Biden
has already incorporated a Civilian Climate Corps and other employment measures in his
Climate Change Executive Order.290
In an ideal world, the economic dislocation from COVID-19 would provide the
excuse to start this process more or less immediately, in concert with President Biden’s
Executive Order. In particular, the climate change redesign alphabet soup could start with
a focus on infrastructure. First steps would be to thoroughly assess existing infrastructure
vulnerabilities to climate change, and then to start upgrading infrastructure capacity in
the areas likely to support concentrated human settlement in the future. W ith a bit more
planning, the federal government could create programs to start building the
infrastructure necessary to decarbonize the energy system, especially in the areas most
likely to support future concentrations of human population. In addition, the federal
government could build on its existing authority under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)291 and other federal pollution
statutes to anticipatorily clean up toxic hotspots, particularly along the coasts, in places
where people are likely to live in the future, in areas where future agriculture is most
likely to flourish, and along likely species and ecosystem migration routes. Reducing the
nation’s toxic burden and exposure is a good idea under any circumstances and could
well help to avoid future adaptation delays (e.g., agriculture can’t shift locations until the
ground is clean enough to grow food) and future environmental justice issues. New
programs within the Department of Agriculture could encourage farmers and universities
to start diversifying agricultural production and experimenting at commercial scale with
climate-resilient crops, while Congress should simultaneously continue and probably
intensify its current interest in promoting deepwater marine aquaculture, albeit in more
explicitly climate-ready and environmentally friendly directions.
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Social Support Networks

The migration scenario we envision will be disruptive. To avoid worsening rather
than improving existing inequities, governments will probably need to expand social
support networks, especially during nonlinear and cascade migration events. Fully
portable health coverage will be beneficial. Food rationing, like during World War II,
may be necessary to ensure distributional equity and at least minimal food security.
Personal migration financing may both become a new financial planning specially, akin
to retirement planning, and require substantial governmental underwriting, such as
through substantially subsidized loans, individual assistance programs, and/or subsidized
mass public transportation to new communities. As noted, retraining support and adult
education will be helpful supports to transition displaced workers to new employment
opportunities.
d.

National Economic Policy

The federal government played a key leadership role in preparing the nation for
World War II in terms of both preparedness and actual conversion of the country’s
industry to a wartime economy.292 “Preparedness” described “the national project to
ready for war by enlarging the military, strengthening certain allies such as Great Britain,
and above all converting America’s industrial base to produce armaments and other war
materiel rather than civilian goods.”293 As two examples, merchant shipbuilding
mobilized to build the wartime fleet, and—albeit with more resistance—automobile
companies converted to aircraft manufacturing.294 The economic conversion was
matched, moreover, by a new wartime administrative bureaucracy.295 A number of
financial innovations, including taxes and war bonds, also contributed to the effort.296
Redesign adaptation will require a similar scale of economic and societal
conversion, both of the World War II type and geographical. There are certainly
constitutional issues that would arise if the government starts ordering people to move,
just as there were constitutional challenges to the government’s actions in World War
II.297 However, there are also synergistic benefits for all involved in coordinating mass
relocations of industries that we want to preserve, such as relocating Silicon Valley to
Detroit. As in World War II, this scale of redesign is best coordinated from the national
government.
292
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C. Anticipatory Governance: Building Future Scenarios for Policy Strategy Design
Perhaps the greatest governance challenge of redesign adaptation is that there will
be no single mode of change—baseline, nonlinear, and cascade changes will be occurring
simultaneously. Nor will a single mode of governance—laissez faire, planning and
prodding, or preemption and mandates—be able to effectively engage that multi-modal
change dynamic across all the relevant variables. Anticipatory adaptation policy design,
therefore, must anticipate both multi-modal change and multi-modal governance. The
question is which governance strategy to aim at which mode of change. For that purpose,
our vastly simplified models of three modes of change and three modes of governance
produce a three-by-three matrix of intersection possibilities, as shown in Table 1.
Obviously, the 4ºC governance world will engage more than nine policy strategies, but
the exercise of conceptualizing even a simplified matrix of change-governance mode
intersections demonstrates the core process of anticipatory governance.
Anticipatory governance refers broadly to policies for “governing in the present
to adapt to or shape uncertain futures.”298 It is a relatively new concept, practiced
primarily in planning disciplines and in futures studies, such as science and technology
and sociology of the future.299 Anticipatory governance depends heavily on constructing
multiple plausible scenarios of the future, embraces rather than denies high levels of
uncertainty, and seeks adaptive policy implementation tools to respond to changing
conditions and knowledge over time.300 Although some legal scholars have incorporated
anticipatory governance into law and policy for emerging technologies,301 only a few
have connected it to climate change adaptation policy.302
We do not here attempt to plumb the depths of adaptive governance theory for
each of the nine policy strategy design intersections in Table 1, which the two of us do
not have the collective expertise to even attempt. Instead, we present this broad overview
to make our central point, developed in the next section, that beginning a data-driven
multi-disciplinary research and planning initiative is the critical first step. A model like
ours, or something like it, can help focus such an initiative by establishing rudimentary
scenarios upon which to guide research and build more detail and refinement towards
policy design.
For example, although laissez faire, market-based responses may be capable of
managing baseline changes such as gradual incorporation of new building materials for
greater insulation, cascade change events such as collapse of regional water supply will
298

Muiderman et al., supra note 18, at 1.
Id. at 5-6.
300
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Millie M. Georgiadis & Margaret Ryznar, Regulating What Has Yet To Be Created: An
Introduction, 98 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 71 (2019); Albert C. Lin, Revamping Our Approach To Emerging
Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2011).
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Indeed, we could identify only one law journal article mentioning anticipatory governance for
climate change adaptation in any substantive manner, doing so in a larger and very comprehensive survey
of anticipatory governance in various urban policy settings. See Edward W. De Barbieri, Urban
Anticipatory Governance, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 75, 102-06 (2018).
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likely overwhelm that governance mode. Conversely, while the strong-arm of federal
preemption may be required to manage the effects of such a cascade event, ensuring the
orderly movement of people and infrastructure to avoid replicating another Dust Bowl, it
may be overkill to use it to manage baseline changes.
That, however, is a very high-level overview of a very simple model of the coming
national governance challenges. Undoubtedly, more sophisticated and subtle blends of
policy instruments are possible allowing for more effective and fine-tuned governance
responses to a spectrum of change mode mixes occurring at different places and among
different subcultures of the U.S. population. As one example, looking just at human
migration, the Gulf Coast (sea level rise and storms), Arizona (heat waves), and Great
Lakes states (in-migration) could be dominated by cascade change while the rest of the
West is dominated by drought-driven nonlinear change while transitional zones plod
along at what still looks mostly like baseline change. That is only one of hundreds of
possible national scenarios that anticipatory governance could consider. Far more
information and deliberation will be needed before governments at any level can
confidently craft governance instruments that assemble the best tools to respond to the
particular mix of change modalities they are most likely to face—as well as the
governance mechanisms to evolve those assemblages as the mix of change modes evolves.
We thus offer the contents of the boxes in Table 1 as illustrations of the kinds of highlevel change-governance modal assessments that will need to occur—assessments that
will require far more detail and refinement before they can be translated into concrete law
and policy for anticipatory adaptation governance.
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Table 1. Change Mode and Governance Mode Intersections.
Laissez Faire

Baseline linear

Potentially effective
in most circumstances
but would still benefit
from coordination
and/or agreed
adaptation goals so
that ad hoc policies
still work toward
common ends.

Nonlinear

Inadequate, because
ad hoc and market
policies are likely to
produce
uncoordinated and
even contradictory
local, state, or
regional responses.

Cascades

Potentially disastrous,
because changes are
occurring too rapidly,
too transformatively,
and on too large a
scale for adaptation to
occur equitably
without significant
government
intervention and
oversight.

Planning and
Prodding
Serves an educational
function and allows
for the building of
legitimacy and public
consensus; allows
equity measures to be
put in place early to
incentivize the most
vulnerable to improve
their positions; allows
early adopters to
prove the advantages.
Necessary to
coordinate adaptation
responses, promote
equity, and minimize
conflicts; preserves
some voluntariness in
individual response;
provides mass
incentives to induce
individuals and
sectors to follow
preferred adaptation
pathways.
Incentives aligned
with the overall
adaptation redesign
can still help to
motivate and
incentivize certain
groups of individuals
and entities to engage
in redesign adaptation
semi-voluntarily.

Preemption and
Mandates
Probably overkill until
the trickle of changes
build up over the
longer term, such as
the eventual
abandonment of
southern and coastal
cities.

Increasingly
necessary in regions
where nonlinear
change occurs on a
large scale;
precautionary
measures provide
warning of future
adaptation
requirements and
increase motivation to
engage early with the
“prods”
Necessary, because at
this point
transformative change
is happening so fast
and on such a large
scale that far more
centralized control is
necessary to achieve
redesign adaptation
equitably and
relatively peacefully.

Two important points can be derived from this simplified exercise. First, state and
local governments deploying the Three Rs of adaptation policy—resist, resilience, and
retreat—are unlikely to achieve sufficiently coordinated or strategic policies to manage
even these nine change-governance modal intersections, especially nonlinear and cascade
change forces needing large-scale prescriptive governance responses. Redesign policies
will be needed, and anticipatory redesign governance needs to occur within a national
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policy framework.303 Second, adaptation planning at all government scales must
explicitly build nonlinear and cascade change into adaptation plans. Behaving as if in situ
climate proofing is plausible for every locality, and that out-migration and in-migration
and what follows from them will not eventually take place at large scales, is not only
unrealistic but also irresponsible. The next section presents our proposal for how to begin.
D. An Initial Step: Creating a National Foresight System for 4ºC Adaptation Planning
Even if it were certain that average global warming will reach 4°C by the end of
this century, high degrees of uncertainty remain regarding what that means for the United
States. Part II outlined broad biophysical patterns of change, many of which are expected
to lead to (or require) movement of domestic population and infrastructure. But how much
movement, when, and to where? What are the impacts on regions experiencing outmigration and in-migration? In short, what future do we anticipate in the planning?
To address questions like these, anticipatory governance begins with a future
scenarios analysis designed to inform flexibility in planning and governance to allow
adjustment to multiple possible realities.304 Anticipatory governance accepts that some
aspects of the future are not knowable and builds that reality into planning.305 It is “a
mode of decision-making that perpetually scans the horizon” in order to develop a datadriven “foresight system,” integrate that foresight into policy-making, and use feedback
to assess and adjust policy implementation.306 That is where adaptation governance for a
4ºC nation must begin, and governance institutions must get used to testing, learning, and
adjusting as the warming unfolds.
As discussed in Part III, climate change adaptation planning has not yet
anticipated the need for redesign when in situ adaptation becomes untenable, but the
forces of change requiring redesign will transpire at all scales of planning, from local to
international. To support planning and governance design at all of these scales, we
propose that the federal government construct a robust national foresight system as the
first step in anticipatory governance for redesign adaptation.
To be effective, such a national foresight system must fully embrace a future 4°C
world. It must be broadly multidisciplinary, uniting climate scientists predicting climate
impacts with anthropologists predicting human responses with technologists developing
the predictive analytics they and the other represented disciplines will use. To give it
gravitas and credence, particularly given it would be delivering mostly unpleasant news,
it would likely need to be formed as a new science-based research bureau or service
303

Some US cities have used techniques of anticipatory governance in connection with climate
change adaptation infrastructure planning, but, as with all local climate adaptation plans to date, the focus
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studies of Denver, New York, and Phoenix).
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within the federal government, akin to the U.S. Geological Survey, rather than as a task
force. The work product cannot be a report, destined to collect headlines followed by
dust, but rather continuous development and dissemination of foresight for redesign
adaptation.
This foresight system initiative would address a broad array of questions relevant
to the next step in anticipatory governance—namely, integrating the foresight into
policymaking. Representative examples include:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Which regions are most likely to experience extreme conditions of heat,
saltwater intrusion, storm, drought, flood, and other climate impacts, and
which the least?
What are plausible social-technological-ecological system cascade failure
scenarios for areas experiencing the most extreme effects?
o What do population demographics and other socioeconomic conditions
suggest in terms of demand for out-migration opportunities?
o Where can migrants go? Of areas experiencing the least effects, which are
most amendable to in-migration, agricultural development, migration
corridors and new habitat, energy production, and other needed land uses?
o What infrastructure will be required for human and agricultural
relocations?
How do the various scenarios hold up under financial and other social system
stress testing?
What technological developments can influence flows of migration and
infrastructure relocation?
What are potential uses of abandoned areas?
What are potential uses of federal public lands to accommodate redesign,
including the possibility of using them as new population centers?
What are projected species migrations and how?

This list is far from exhaustive. Indeed, the objective of the initiative would be to
construct and continuously refine as close to “whole world” future scenarios as possible.
Although in the previous section we suggested broad governance implications for
different change modes, we go no further in this Article than to urge creation of this
national foresight system. Based on what experts believe they know now, summarized in
Part II, a significantly warming United States will experience multiple disruptions at a
variety of scales. Our nation can choose to go into that future blind and unprepared, or
can go into it with foresight and adaptive planning, having made many of the difficult
governance decisions in advance. Given the high probability that our future is a 4°C
world, the two of use choose foresight and adaptive planning.
CONCLUSION
We fully expect critics will cast us as prophets of exaggerated doom and gloom.
However, we are simply the bearers of the bad news science is producing, translating it
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into a governance scenario that seems more than plausible once one considers how
different, and how horrible, a 4°C world looks compared to the one we live in today.
Other critics might fully accept our depiction of the 4°C future and the governance
challenges it poses, but scoff at the idea that our nation could actually put together a plan
and then follow it when conditions begin to unravel. They could point to our nation’s
handling of the coronavirus pandemic as Exhibit 1. But that misses the point. We are not
proposing a plan “for later,” when the world moves past 2°C of warming, but rather a
starting action to put anticipatory redesign adaptation measures into place. The time to
start building national adaptation foresight is now.
We now come full circle to what motivated this project—our concern that climate
change will lead to a tipping point in our nation’s governance. Recent experience justifies
our concern.
Americans overestimate the resilience of our democracy to our peril. Notably,
martial law—essentially, the conversion of a democratic regime to an authoritarian one—
was raised as a possibility during the coronavirus pandemic307 and could certainly become
a governance strategy to cope with a 4°C world. The storming of the U.S. Capitol on
January 6, 2021, as Congress tallied Electoral College votes, provides stark evidence that
social and governance tipping points (“flash points”) exist even in the United States,
allowing the previously unthinkable to become reality in a matter of hours.308 Magnifying
this discomforting truth, a 4°C world has the potential to push the United States (and
much of the world) all the way back to tribalism as the basic mode of governance,309 hints
307
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of which also surfaced during the pandemic.310
Scholars and politicians alike could debate endlessly the amount and variety of
cultural, social, political, and economic fracture lines in the United States (and other
nations)311 and the relative importance of each to climate change adaptation. The more
important point here, as the coronavirus pandemic deftly demonstrated,312 is that different
regions of the United States “instinctively” react to new crises differently. Climate change
will likely complicate these already divisive instincts further by posing different
adaptation challenges in different regions, some of which are more familiar to those
populations (e.g., drought in the Southwest) than are others (e.g., mass migration, collapse
of basic infrastructure like drinking water and sewage systems, water-borne disease).
Even well-functioning democratic governance systems will need to adapt in order
to manage a 4°C world effectively, and the United States’ current default to an extreme
version of individualistic democracy will not serve us well. Our democracy focuses on
preserving individual choice, ensuring broad participation in governance at all levels for
all decisions, and protection of private property, often at the expense of public values.313
The cost of such individualism can be and often has been a lack of comprehensive and
coordinated economic and social planning at almost any scale, from communities to the
nation as a whole.314 Indeed, responses to the coronavirus epidemic in the United States

310

Although, allegiances to tribes may have helped us survive up until this point in human history,
it may be having the exact opposite effect today. As one commentator observed, “there seems to be a
difference in the way we are responding to the COVID-19 pandemic depending on the tribe (friends, church
groups, news feeds and TV networks) we have aligned ourselves with.” Thomas Pagano, Tribalism in a
Time
of
COVID-19,
CITIZEN
TIMES
(April
16,
2020),
https://www.citizentimes.com/story/opinion/2020/04/16/coronavirus-nc-tribalism-time-covid-19-opinion/5135096002/. See
also Yuval Levine, Tribalism Comes for Pandemic Science, THE NEW ATLANTIS (June 5, 2020),
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/tribalism-comes-for-pandemic-science;
Sarah
Lahn,
Midwest Dispatch: Republican Tribalism Won’t Protect Us from the Pandemic, THE PROGRESSIVE (Nov.
17, 2020), https://progressive.org/dispatches/republican-tribalism-wont-protect-pandemic-lahm-201117/.
311
For a sweeping discussion of the perilous state of democracy in the United States, see SANFORD
LEVINSON & JACK M. BALKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DYSFUNCTION (Univ. Chicago Press 2019).
312
E.g., Tucker Doherty, Victoria Guida, Bianca Quilantan, & Gabrielle Wanneh, Which States
had the Best Pandemic Response?, POLITICO (as updated Oct. 15, 2020, 04:05 PM EDT),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/14/best-state-responses-to-pandemic-429376.
313
Constitutional takings and standing limitations on environmental protection provide two
obvious examples at the federal level. For discussion of takings limitations, see generally, e.g., Beckett G.
Cantley, Environmental Preservation and the Fifth Amendment: The Use and Limits of Conservation
Easements by Regulatory Taking and Eminent Domain, 20 HASTINGS W-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215
(Winter 2014); ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MARRIEN, & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE:
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (Washington, D.C.:
Island Press 1999). For discussions of standing limitations, see generally, e.g., Jeffrey T. Hammons, Note,
Public Interest Standing and Judicial Review of Environmental Matters: A Comparative Approach, 41
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 515 (2016); Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”:
Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
149 (Oct. 2007); Jeffrey W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An
Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 345 (Spring
1994).
314
Notably, a nation’s commitment to individualism appears to be related to its susceptibility to
disease outbreaks. See Serge Morand & Bruno A. Walther, Individualistic values are related to an increase

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3806040

March 2021

4°C

61

exposed many of the weaknesses of this governance orientation at a moment when a
strong national response to the crisis was required.315 Multiple governments and levels of
government issued uncoordinated and occasionally contradictory responses,316 leading to
costly “loss from anarchy.”317 Individuals felt free to mistrust, deny, and distort the
science and to ignore “shelter in place” orders and health-preserving best practices like
wearing a face mask, leading to notable resurgences in infection rates in many states after
the Memorial Day, July 4, Labor Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year
holidays.318 Nationwide, there was a general disregard for public welfare, ranging from
an inability or unwillingness to institute comprehensive COVID testing programs319 to
limited and only short-term social support measures that increased the pressures to go
back to work.320
Nothing in this experience, fueled by an increasingly politically sectarian
321
nation, bodes well for envisioning how an individualistic democracy would manage
life at 4°C. To be sure, it will take a long time to reach 4°C, but the tipping points along
the way will lead to cascades of change in social-ecological systems that will rival the
pandemic in their flash point disruption effects. If we had developed a robust national
foresight system for pandemics and followed through with planning and implementation,
the experience might have been much different. Knowing that, we can do better to prepare
the nation for the path to 4°C. The first step is gaining foresight.
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